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Abstract
In this dissertation the feasibility of creating a page-cache effi-
cient storage- and messaging solution with integrity geared ac-
cess control for a scalable forensic framework is researched. The
Open Computer Forensics Architecture (OCFA),a lab-side scal-
able computer forensics framework, introduced the concept of a
message passing concurrency based forensic framework. Since
then, the amount of per-investigation data to be processed in a
lab environment has continued to grow significantly while avail-
able RAM and CPU processing power combined with prohibitive
cost and limited capacity of SSD solutions have shifted process-
ing from being largely CPU constrained to being much more IO
constrained. OCFA suffered from several page-cache-miss related
performance issues that have grown more significant as a result
of this shift. In the light of anti-forensics and general issues re-
lated to process integrity, OCFA did not leverage the power of its
message passing based design to address integrity concerns.
The main purpose of this dissertation is to analyze and evalu-
ate a number of page-cache friendly technologies that could con-
tribute to the creation of a computer forensics lab-geared scal-
able message-passing-concurrency based forensic framework with
a significantly reduced quantity of page-cache-miss induced spu-
rious IO operations, taking into account integrity related issues.
Provenance logs from historic investigations conducted using
the Open Computer Forensics Architecture were thoroughly an-
alyzed in this study, during which several bottlenecks and design
flaws in OCFA were identified. A number of strategies were de-
vised to address these bottlenecks in future computer forensic
frameworks. Finally, the most prominently page-cache related
strategies were consolidated with access-control measures into a
user-space file-system and low-level API prototype.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
In 2006, the Dutch National Police open-sourced a scalable message-passing
concurrency based digital forensic framework that had already been used in-
ternally for several years. Development of The Open Computer Forensics
Architecture (OCFA) was first prompted by a large scale investigation in-
volving fraud in the real estate sector in 2001, where digital evidence from
80 distinct search and seizures led to serious scalability issues in the forensic
process when using the then standard commercial forensic tools available at
that time. Development on and support of OCFA by the Dutch National
Police was discontinued in 2012, leaving a void that is yet to be filled by an
alternative open source solution.
In order to address scalability and robustness concerns, OCFA introduced
the concept of a message passing concurrency based forensic framework, and
due to storage concerns, early versions of OCFA made use of Content Ad-
dressed Storage (CAS) technology. OCFA, as most forensic solutions of that
time was geared towards completeness and less so on IO efficiency.
One of the main architectural components in the Open Computer Foren-
sics Architecture was a server named the Anycast Relay. This Anycast Relay
was what today would be called a message bus or an enterprise-messaging
solution. The Anycast Relay allowed a module process in the OCFA set-up
to register as a worker instance. Any given OCFA set-up could have multiple
instances running simultaneously for any given module functionality. Sub-
mitting a message to the Anycast Relay directed at a given module name
would result in it (eventually) being delivered to exactly one, or to phrase
it differently, to any of the worker instances. Hence the name Anycast. The
Anycast message bus worked with persistent priority queues that for practical
intents and purposes were infinite in size.
While somewhat mitigated by advances in computer forensic triage, lead-
ing to large amounts of triaged data not finding its way to the lab, the
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amount of per-investigation data to be processed in a lab environment has
continued to grow significantly. At the same time, while Solid State Disk
(SSD) technology has shifted bottlenecks for small-scale investigations from
IO-constrained to CPU-constrained, the combination of increased available
RAM and CPU processing power combined with prohibitive cost and limited
capacity of SSD solutions have created a situation where for a full-scale in-
vestigation the opposite has become a reality. The old completeness strategy
should no longer be considered in sync with today’s reality in digital foren-
sics, and some of the design decisions made for OCFA have proven to be
seriously IO constrained on modern server hardware. The IO performance
of OCFA is greatly limited by naive implementation of infinite size queue
based message passing and other fundamental design choices that end up re-
sulting in several page-cache-miss related performance issues. While OCFA
development has been discontinued, there is a continued need for a com-
puter forensics architecture that combines some of the features that OCFA
offered such as scalability, a unified forensic API and the ability to assist in
cross house-search data analysis. Many of the lessons learned from a decade
of OCFA usage should prove useful in the development of the next genera-
tion message-passing concurrency based digital forensic framework. This is
assuming that IO efficiency issues can be addressed.
Also in 2006, the Dutch National Police released a computer forensic
file-system for zero-storage file carving named CarvFS, while at that same
time Richards et al [3] were independently working on a paper on In-place
file carving and a relatively similar file-system named ScalpelFS. Both zero-
storage and In-place file carving refer to the idea that instead of creating a
copy of the data of a carved file and storing that copy in a file-system using
its own allocated disk-space, a user-space file-system can be used to present
a read-only file abstraction of the carved file without the need to allocate
any additional disk storage on a regular file-system. CarvFS introduced the
concept of using pseudo file-names as designation for potentially fragmented
data files within an archive. Later versions of OCFA used CarvFS not just
for regular carving, but also in conjunction with regular file-system forensics,
using the Sleuth-kit library for different modules. A way to look at ScalpelFS
and CarvFS is as a file-system abstraction for a flat secondary storage address
space.
OCFA and CarvFS use technologies, user-space file-systems and an actor-
model message passing approach for concurrency, that are fundamentally well
suited for implementing privilege separation and access control. The way
these were used and combined by the Dutch National Police however, while
reasonable within the reality of that day, should no longer be considered to
be in sync with the reality of anti-forensic technology. There is need for a
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computer forensic process that is able to maintain data integrity even when
the integrity of individual tools in the tool-chain end up being compromised.
The research described in this paper leverages the use of flat secondary
storage address space for the purpose of page-cache miss induced spurious
IO event reduction. This within the context of an OCFA inspired sub system
that aims to be a main component in a next generation computer forensic
framework. Aside from this primary concern, it also tries to take important
steps regarding the provisioning of measures towards fulfilling integrity needs
of the modern day computer forensic process.
In this research, a set of provenance log records from real-life investiga-
tions is used to identify the most important IO bottlenecks in the OCFA
system, and to give direction to the rest of the research. Using these find-
ings, a general outline for a possible future computer forensic framework is
created, and the main potential IO optimization techniques are explored and
later integrated in a user-space file-system that combines most of the the old
CarvFS and Anycast Relay functionality with measures and strategies for
IO efficiency. In the interface and functionality provided by this file-system,
extra care is given to address privilege separation access control hooks and
integrity provisions regarding the logging of provenance information.
The results from the provenance log analysis proved very useful in further
research. Four possible IO efficiency strategies were identified:
• Opportunistic hashing: Calculating hashes of open pseudo-files and in-
queue files opportunistically from data accessed in low-level read and
write actions.
• Linux system calls on open archive file: The Linux OS provides specific
system calls for communicating intent regarding future reads and writes
that are used by the kernel for page-cache strategies.
• Throttling: A good way for avoiding page-cache misses is throttling
new data input so the page-cache over-commitment is kept in check.
• Message bus job picking strategies: Implement different sane job pick-
ing strategies for workers, either aimed at optimized page-cache outflow
or at better opportunistic hashing outcome.
These strategies were all implemented in a user-space file-system prototype.
Chapter 2
Literature Survey
This study brings together a number of subjects with aspects that were found
in academic literature. The combination of specific subjects brought together
into a coherent digital forensic setting around one central paradigm appears
to currently be a unique approach. The central paradigm of using a single flat
secondary storage address space for digital forensic data has found relatively
little traction since the first publications of the core technique as measure for
storage effective file carving. No subsequent publications have been found
on the subject. Much of this study focusses on the effective integration
of our central paradigm into the message passing concurrency model. A
concurrency model first introduced in digital forensics by the now orphaned
open source Open Computer Forensics Architecture project. A concurrency
model that is also linked tightly to the Actor model of computation. A
model of computation widely covered in academic literature. Given the goal
of applying the research subject to an envisioned digital forensics framework,
the survey also looked into papers for clues on developments that could prove
relevant for the research topic. This part of the survey identified a number of
desired properties that proved partially relevant for our research and should
prove relevant to the eventual deployment of the results of our research into
a future computer forensics framework. It also deepened the link with the
Actor model of computation and introduced essential access control concerns
that while not the central subject of this study proved important enough
to include in the implementation stage of this research project. The final
part of our survey looked into the concept of opportunistic hashing. While
the opportunistic part of this subject was not found in our survey, recent
development in the cryptography sub-field of secure hashing ended up proving
to be crucial to digital forensics as a whole and to the topic of this study in
particular.
Richard et al [3] Introduced the concept of a single flat secondary stor-
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age address space as a tool for doing In place file-carving. Unaware of this
ongoing research, the Dutch National Police developed the user space file-
system CarvFS [10] for exactly the same purpose, and dubbed the same
concept zero-storage file-carving. The Open Computer Forensics Architec-
ture as described by Vermaas et al [1] made limited use of this zero-storage
carving concept. Not only for file carving in the narrow sense, but also for
designating files that were found using file-system forensics.
S.L. Garfinkel [11] identified a number of concerns that are relevant to
any next generation computer forensics environment and some of these are
also relevant to our research topic. Garfinkel states that to emphasize on
completeness without concern for speed has created a situation where very
few tools can perform a five minute analysis. While a five minute analysis
would be pressing in the field rather than in the lab, it is important for our
research to allow for a less complete analysis and better support for a light
analysis than what OCFA provided for. Garfinkel also highlights the need
to move away from monolithic applications, an approach that OCFA already
introduced for robustness and software reuse purposes. A more pressing issue
that Garfinkel raises is the problem with the transition of academia to end
users when it comes to the results of academic research, and the problem of
applying forensic frameworks primarily targeted at an investigation setting
to an academic research setting. We take these problems as an important
indicator towards the need for computer forensics frameworks and their com-
ponents that are suitable for both an academic setting and for a full scale
digital forensic investigation. An idea that is further underlined in the call
for a stable and scale independent API for computer forensics frameworks.
Wood et al [12] showed the role of data containers in the chain of custody
recording and made a case for the use of AFF4 and/or DFXML within the
context of multi disk image digital forensic data repositories. Access con-
trol is also looked at in detail with respect to access by individuals. They
take the approach that image provenance and integrity are to be guarded by
means of container format technology. Chatz and Clark [8] from the prospect
of container files introduce the concept of Sealed Digital Evidence Bags. A
non-monolithic variant of the Digital Evidence Bag concept. They describe
how data and meta-data, once written should be sealed by means of sig-
natures. They define a taxonomy that further highlights the importance of
solid provenance information recording and integrity.
It is in provenance information that we reconnect with the Actor model
and with aspects that most touch on the research at hand. Hewitt [13]
amongst other principles lists Persistence, Concurrency and Provenance as
core information system principles for information integration. He defines the
actor model, to be based on one-way asynchronous communication. While
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in OCFA message ordering was strictly maintained, Hewitt explains how the
Actor model puts no restriction on message reception order. With respect
to performance and the Actor model, Hewitt defines as most important tool
the minimization of latency along critical paths. It is exactly the lack of such
minimization that was found at the core of the OCFA performance issues.
Finally Hewitt defines a set of three Actor address acquisition possibilities
that should prove crucial in addressing security concerns for the implemen-
tation. A Spiessens [16] provides us with an overview of patterns for the
use of capabilities for the implementation of privilege separation and coop-
erating objects or processes that prove applicable to part of our computer
forensics access control requirements. Meijer [9] implemented a user space
file system based on sparse-capabilities especially for privilege separation and
access control purposes in a high-integrity setting.
With respect to scalability and modern scalability technology, Carrier
et al [14] worked on a Sleuth-kit Hadoop framework. Work on this project
seems to have discontinued. Some of the findings however were shared with
us and should prove useful in future work on multi-node set-ups. An other
scalability insight was presented within the FIVES Architecture [2] in its
introduction of an alternate router for OCFA.
The last subject of this study concerns opportunistic hashing. Until to-
day most computer forensic tools make use of SHA1 or MD5 as algorithm
for creating digital signatures. NIST [15] defines SHA1 as being deprecated
for signing purposes, while use of SHA1 for the digital forensic file matching
scenario is still considered acceptable use. In 2015 Stevens et al [4] presented
a working free-start collision against SHA-1. While a free-start collision isn’t
a full SHA-1 collision yet, it does present an important milestone on the road
to a full SHA-1 collision. From a cryptographic point of view this means that
SHA-1 isn’t a solid choice to base new technological developments on. On
the other hand, while NIST has been providing SHA256 hashes with their
hash sets that address security issues, there are serious performance concerns
with SHA256 and its use in digital forensic frameworks. As such, the recent
advances regarding SHA1 collision resistance make us face the additional
challenge of finding a suitable core hashing algorithm to implement our op-
portunistic hashing study with. In the selection of SHA3 candidates by NIST
[5], different aspects were looked at, including security and performance as-
pects of the different candidates. This assessment made clear that two former
SHA3 candidates, Skein and BLAKE would be particularly suitable for usage
within computer forensics due to their software performance characteristics.
These candidates set us on the path of BLAKE2 [6]. Guo et al [7] showed an
analysis of BLAKE2 that led to the conclusion that BLAKE2 would be the
best candidate for our opportunistic hashing purposes, specifically for digital
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forensics in general.
While our literature survey yielded a wide range of relevant research, the
idea of using a flat secondary storage address space as core of a page-cache
friendly Actor based set-up for digital forensic frameworks, as well as the idea
of opportunistic hashing within such a framework, appear to be a completely
new research topic.
Chapter 3
Problem statement & adapted
approach
Lab-side semi-automated processing of large amounts of digital forensic ev-
idence data within the context of medium to large criminal investigations
requires tooling that goes beyond the scalability limitations of common com-
mercial tools. In the past, OCFA provided an open source framework that
has proven useful in both a law-enforcement and, to some extent, in an aca-
demic setting. Next to the fact that development and support of OCFA has
discontinued, relative changes in the speed and latency between CPU, RAM,
Network IO and disk IO of computer forensic lab servers, and new insights
regarding anti-forensic threats and the requirements for system robustness
have made some design choices made at OCFA inception, choices that in
today’s reality should be considered sub-optimal.
At the time of inception, CPU, next to disk-IO, was a major bottleneck
in most investigations. Avoiding page-cache misses wasn’t that promising a
goal as RAM in a typical server wasn’t anywhere close to the size where high
amounts of page-cache misses could have been expected to be avoided. Look-
ing at developments since OCFA inception we see that while high throughput
low latency Solid State Disk (SSD) solutions have become available, their size
and pricing should still be considered prohibitive for the deployment of the
triple digit, and bigger, terabyte storage solutions required in modern day
medium to large scale digital forensic investigations. RAM sizes and RAM
speed have gone up considerably as has the number of cores available in a
typical computer forensics lab server. Non SSD storage however, while hav-
ing continued to grow cheaper, has not kept up with the rest of the hardware
improvements. As a result of these changes, the shortcomings of the archi-
tecture used in OCFA with regards to inefficient use of secondary storage IO
have become the dominating performance bottleneck. In today’s reality the
10
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scalability properties of the OCFA architecture should be considered mostly
deprecated.
Our literature survey identified a continued need for an open source scal-
able computer forensic framework suitable for both academic research and
criminal investigations, that could fill the gap that the discontinuation of
OCFA development has created. A framework that could only be realized
if secondary storage IO efficiency and system robustness requirements can
both be met.
3.1 Goal
We wish to investigate the viability of creating the foundation for an OCFA
inspired next generation scalable message passing concurrency computer foren-
sics framework suitable for both academic research and full scale criminal
investigations that addresses the page-cache and system integrity concerns
identified.
3.2 Research questions
• What were the historic page-cache related bottlenecks within the OCFA
architecture?
• How could these page-cache related bottlenecks be addressed in a future
framework?
• What role could the flat secondary-storage address-space model, in-
troduced by CarvFS and ScalpelFS, play in solving page-cache related
bottlenecks?
• What role could an opportunistic form of hashing play in solving page-
cache related bottlenecks?
• What were the anti-forensic weaknesses within the OCFA architecture?
• How could these anti-forensic weaknesses be addressed in a future
framework?
• What role could the sparse capability based access-control model, in-
troduced by MinorFS, play in solving anti-forensic weaknesses?
• Can the above concerns be fully or partially implemented within a
proof-of-concept computer-forensics framework component?
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3.3 Adopted Approach
Before attempting to solve any problem, the first step in the approach is
identifying and quantifying page-cache related bottlenecks and design short-
comings of the existing OCFA framework. In order to do this, we make use
of profiling/provenance logs from a small set of real investigations that were
made available for this research by the Dutch national police.
Using the log files as extracted from archived historic database dumps, we
look to quantify the problem as it existed in the past, and look at the effec-
tiveness of the limited measures implemented by OCFA that should in theory
mitigate some of the perceived problems. Using the same data, we map the
typical tool-chain path, both quantified on a per-file basis and quantified on
a per data-volume basis.
From our findings in this first step we identify the main bottlenecks and
look at finding ways to avoid or attenuate these problems in a future computer
forensics framework. From this broader perspective, we then take the concept
of a flat secondary-storage address-space, as simultaneously introduced by
both CarvFS and ScalpelFS, and look at how that concept could facilitate
a more page-cache friendly storage and/or messaging system that would be
usable in the future implementation of such a framework. The potential flat
secondary-storage address-space related concepts we investigate are:
• Page-cache friendly archive interaction.
• Page-cache friendly message-bus interaction.
• Opportunistic hashing.
Special attention is given for opportunistic hashing to take the results
from the literature survey into account regarding the suitability of hashing
algorithms.
From our findings from the literature study, we look at fitting in those
controls needed to guard the forensic integrity of the forensic data processing.
We investigate the possibilities to guard the tool-chain and system integrity,
even in the case of compromised or buggy code in a particular framework
module. Robustness and process integrity concepts we investigated are:
• A lab-side privilege-separation equivalent of the Sealed Digital Evi-
dence Bags concept.
• Trusted provenance logs.
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With the results of these two assessments, a proof of concept sub-system
was implemented that could serve as the foundation of a future high-integrity
page-cache friendly computer forensic framework.
To conclude the research, the results are evaluated and advice is given as
to how future research could aid in the completion of a full successor to the
now deprecated OCFA framework.
Chapter 4
Analysis of OCFA provenance
logs
In this chapter, the results of the first steps of the adopted approach are
discussed in detail. This is done by describing the outcome of the first two
main phases of the research:
1. Analyze the OCFA timing information.
2. Identify the main bottlenecks within the OCFA framework.
4.1 Analysis of the OCFA timing information
In this section we look at identifying the main bottlenecks through an analysis
of OCFA timing information.
4.1.1 Extracting the timing information
The Dutch National Police made a set of database dumps from old OCFA
runs available for use in this study. One important prerequisite however was
that the sensitive investigative data would under no circumstances become
part of the scientific research. In order to adhere to these preconditions, a
Python script was created to parse the database dumps and to extract only
those parts of the data that were essential for technical evaluation related
to timing. In theory this information should be sufficient to base our re-
search and evaluations on. It could be possible that a better foundation of
our findings would be possible when including non-directly timing related
information. The python script as referenced in a following appendix did the
following:
14
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• Extract the evidence XML blobs from the SQL dump.
• Extract the oldest timestamp from the XML blobs and use that time
as offset for the successive steps.
• Process each individual XML blob and extract only the relative start
and stop times and module types for each job, as well as the sizes of
the job-bound data entities.
• Write the extracted information to a JSON based log file.
The true analysis of the OCFA timing information took place on the resulting
JSON based log files. It is important to note that due to a bug in the
OCFA Java library at the time these investigations were active, there are
some (detectable/reversible) offset bugs in the results. These needed to be
corrected during the actual analysis.
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4.1.2 A fictitious perfect cache
In our first analysis we look at data entities from our four investigations
from a first seen / last seen event perspective. We define a model where a
fictitious perfect infinite-size cache is used. Every time a piece of data is
first seen, its data size is added to the virtual cache. Every time a piece
of data is last seen, it is removed from the cache. Figure 4.1 on page 17
shows the probability density function of the required amount of RAM to
implement such a perfect disk cache. The X axis is the log10C where C is
the required capacity for the fictitious cache size at any random point in time
during an active OCFA run. When we look at figure 4.1, depending on the
investigation, we see some different results depending on the investigation.
While for example a fictitious cache size of 109 (1 GB) would fit all active
data for about 65% for investigation one, the same amount would yield a
fit for only one or two percent of the time in investigation three. One main
conclusion that we can draw from three out of four investigations is that most
still active data could not possibly stay contained in any reasonable amount
of physical RAM memory that the OCFA machines might have had. In the
following sub sections we discuss why this is the case.
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Figure 4.1: Virtual cache size probability density
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Figure 4.2: Inter-job time probability density
4.1.3 Inter-job timing
Figure 4.2 on page 18 shows the probability density function of the inter-
module time for modules processing the same evidence. In the previous
subsection we discovered the fact that most of the active data would not fit
in the physical memory of an OCFA server. When we look however at the
probability density function of the time between two jobs, we discover that
between about 60% and 90% of all inter-job times falls below 101 seconds
mark. While there are times extending up to and exceeding the 106 seconds
visible in some of the graphs, most of the inter-module times are so small in
comparison that disk cache hits would seem almost inevitable. These results
are quite inconclusive so far, so we need to look at other results.
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Figure 4.3: Inter-job time probability density by volume
4.1.4 Inter-job timing by content size
If instead of weighing the probability density function by the number of data
events, we weigh it by the amount of data, the picture that we saw in the
previous subsection shifts significantly. Figure 4.3 on page 19 shows this
shift. A relatively large portion of the data now shows to have a job time
interval of well over 104 seconds. That means multiple hours, long enough to
expect any disk caching to long have been overwritten so that a consecutive
read would surely lead to a disk-cache miss.
4.1.5 First-last timing
Given that our inter-job timing stats were inconclusive so far, we look at the
timing interval between the first module creating the data entity and the last
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Figure 4.4: First-last time probability density
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data processing module being done with it. In 4.4 on page 20 we see that
while less pronounced than for ?? on page 18, it is still a majority of about
60% to 80% of evidence entities that will be completely done in less than
ten seconds. These results while being in line with our expectations for the
OCFA priority system, still don’t match the other results we have seen so
far.
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Figure 4.5: First-last time probability density by volume
4.1.6 First-last timing by content size
In 4.5 on page 22 we see the pattern we saw earlier in figure 4.3, but much
more pronounced. In most of the four investigations, a majority of the data
will take multiple hours to get from the first module to touch/produce it, to
the last module to process its data. This is again a clear sign that we can
expect a large number of disk cache misses during the lifetime of a piece of
larger data within the OCFA system.
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Figure 4.6: In/out flow probability density
4.1.7 Inflow and outflow for our fictitious cache
The pictures in 4.6 on page 23 finally show the problem with the disk
cache misses. Note that for visual reasons the density function for outflow is
plotted as negative density on the positive part of the inflow axes rather than
as positive density negative inflow. This to more clearly show the contrast
between inflow and outflow density. The diagrams show both the probability
density of growth of the amount of active data in the system, and on the
negative axis the probability density of shrinkage in one minute intervals.
If we remember that this density function is plotted on a logarithmic X
axis, we can identify that the growth density on the bottom end of the
graphs is higher than the shrinkage density on the upper end of the graph
for most of the four investigations. This means that while there may be many
minutes where there is significant shrinkage, over time the amount of active
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data will grow as new data continues being submitted to the system. These
results show clearly that for the OCFA system, for most of the investigations,
there is an imbalance between the data input speed and the overall data
processing speed. With knowledge about the dominant module in specific
investigation, as discussed in the next subsection, we can further conclude
that the significant production of new evidence data events by modules other
than the Java based kickstart, significantly increases the visual noticeable
imbalance in these graphs.
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4.1.8 Inter-module flows
The figures 4.7, 4.8, 4.9 and 4.10 show an overview of the data and event flow
between modules in the four cases we have been examining. The most promi-
nent flows data-wise are indicated in red arrows, followed by black arrows for
less prominent data flows and green for flows that are almost negligible in
data flow but not in terms of event count. Solid arrows indicate a prominence
in the number of data events, followed by dashed arrows for less prominent
event flows and dotted arrows for flows that are negligible in event flow but
not in data flow. Flows that are both almost negligible in data-flow and in
event flow are not displayed to keep the figures from becoming too filled with
irrelevant information. Note that modules in a role as as data producers are
denoted using a square box while (possibly the same) modules in their role
as data consumer are denoted with an oval shape. Even though there are
important differences due to the differences in types of and size of investiga-
tions, we also see a few clear similarities in these flows. To emphasize these
similarities, figure 4.11 on page 30 shows these same information using a
grouping for modules that play a less prominent role. Below we summarize
the core information that we can conclude from this figure.
1. The majority of all data (roughly between 80% and 95%) is forwarded
by the kickstart functionality to the carver functionality and never
passes the digest checking module.
2. The majority of evidence data checked by the digest check module
originates from either the carver or the kickstarting functionality.
3. About one third to half of the data sent to the digest check module
originates from the carver, about 50% to 60% from the kickstart func-
tionality.
4. Only roughly 1% to 15% of evidence data sent to the digest check
module ends up matching. The remaining data is forwarded to the
file-type check module.
5. Only roughly 15% to 35% of data forwarded to the file-type check
module ends up being forwarded for processing any further.
This information, combined with what we have seen in our earlier analyses
allows us to draw some important conclusions that we shall discuss in the
following sections of this appendix.
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Figure 4.7: Case 1 inter-module flows
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Figure 4.8: Case 2 inter-module flows
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4.2 Identifying the main bottlenecks within
the OCFA architecture
In this section we look at the information gathered from analyzing the OCFA
timing info from four investigations and try to draw well founded conclusions
from this data by combining it with knowledge about the OCFA architecture.
4.2.1 Effectiveness of OCFA throughput measures
As we have seen in the event based graphs looking at the cumulative proba-
bility density of per data entity timing, the priority queuing would seem to be
effective, and would be quite effective if all data entities were similarly sized.
Looking though at the data-volume-adjusted probability density graphs, we
see that the effectiveness of priority queuing becomes questionable at best.
We don’t have sufficient proof to state that the measure may be anti produc-
tive from a cache hit rate point of view, but it’s something that at this point
in time seems like a viable hypothesis. A hypothesis though that we must
leave untested as there is no comparative material available to test it against.
It is safe to say though that from a cache-hit efficiency point of view, the
priority queuing mechanism proves to be at best insufficient.
4.2.2 The effects of meta-data messaging inefficiency
and centralized router
One of the known performance bottlenecks of OCFA is the implementation
of meta-data access. Conceptually an evidence entity is forwarded between
modules through the messaging system. Due to monitoring concerns though,
an approach was taken where short messages were used instead with an
internal reference to a BLOB inside of the Postgres database. The process
for processing and forwarding an evidence entity to a module or router is the
following:
• Module receives an incoming message from the Anycast relay and ex-
tracts the meta-data ID from the message
• Module retrieves the XML blob containing the evidence trace from
Postgres, validates and parses the XML into a DOM tree and then
extracts the data ID from the XML
• Module retrieves the evidence data filesystem path from Postgres
• Module Processes the data
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• Module adds additional meta-data to the DOM tree, serializes the
DOM tree to a new version of the XML trace and updates the XML
BLOB in the Postgres database.
• Module sends a return message to the Anycast asking to forward it to
the router.
• Anycast marks the old message as processed and places the new mes-
sage in the router queue. When router queue reaches message, Anycast
sends message to the router
• Router receives an incoming message from the Anycast relay, and ex-
tracts the meta-data ID from the message
• Router retrieves the XML blob containing the evidence trace from Post-
gres, validates and parses the XML into a DOM tree, traverses the
meta-data and determines the next module to process the evidence
entity
• Router adds additional meta-data to the DOM tree, serializes the DOM
tree to a new version of the XML trace and updates the XML BLOB
in the Postgres database
• Router sends a return message to the Anycast asking to forward it to
the specific next module.
• Anycast marks old message as processed and places the new message
in the router queue.
• When module queue reaches message, Anycast sends message to the
next module
It’s easy to see that there is quite some overhead in messaging and routing.
There are a number of known bottlenecks in this process that would be
suitable for addressing the speed of the OCFA framework.
• The use of XML, XML-schema and related technology was very much
current when OCFA was designed. In retrospect though, XML is a
highly expensive serialization technique and other serialization possi-
bilities like JSON or FlatBuffers would likely have given significantly
less overhead.
• The use of a separate router process means that much of the overhead
is repeated twice. Moving the router functionality into the messaging
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library and thus into the module processes could half this overhead and
make for a major overhead reduction.
So to summarize, there is quite some room for improvement in the efficiency
of the cross module timing. We can assume that any future OCFA successor
that aims to use a similar message based concurrency model will implement
such improvements.
CHAPTER 4. ANALYSIS OF OCFA PROVENANCE LOGS 34
4.2.3 Bottlenecks and possible solutions
From the analysis of the timing information from four real life OCFA runs,
and our knowledge of the OCFA system we can draw some conclusions re-
garding the inability of the OCFA design to effectively minimize the amount
of disk-cache misses. We can also draw conclusions with respect to what may
be improved in the design of a new OCFA-like system that could improve
both the disk-cache efficiency and the overall throughput of the system.
• The un-throttled input of new data into the system creates an imbal-
ance between inflow and outflow that leads to far higher amounts of
active data than can be accounted for by disk cache, inevitably lead-
ing to massive amounts of disk cache misses. A form of throttling for
new data submission is a necessity for effectively addressing disk cache
efficiency.
• The percentage of data that is discarded after a file-type check is more
significant when compared to the percentage of data that is discarded
after a hash value check. It would seem logical to design a new system
in such a way that file-type checking happens before the file is actually
fully read by the framework, as to remove unneeded overhead from
reading the file data, either to copy it out or to determine the file hash.
This seems one argument in favor of opportunistic hashing.
• When looking at the chain of modules that processes particular data, it
is not uncommon for the first full read to be the result of the on-creation
hashing, while the second and often last full read happens in the last
module before the (in OCFA) meta-data-only Data Store Module. This
means that if hashing could be delayed to a later module, that while
the entity processing time may stay approximately the same, the disk-
cache hit could improve resulting from the reduced first full-read last
full-read timing.
• The percentage of data that constitutes large entities without in any-
way meaningful hash value (such as whole partitions or unallocated
space cluster collections) makes up a majority of all data processed.
Traversing such large data chunks for the sole purpose of calculating a
set of hashes, as is done in the OCFA architecture is wasteful. This is
a second argument in favor of opportunistic hashing.
• The percentage of larger data that is processed that is a chunk of other
data being processed is significant. This implies that the page cache
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size requirements could potentially be reduced by making extensive use
of annotation based addressing such as used in CarvFS.
From a disk-cache efficiency viewpoint, we are proposing three distinct yet
interdependent measures:
• Opportunistic hashing: Calculate hashes opportunistically when an en-
tity as a whole is either being written or read.
• Annotation based data access: Use of a CarvFS alike system for access-
ing data as chunks within a bigger whole.
• New-data input throttling: Keep track of active data in the system and
throttle input accordingly.
While not the core subject of this dissertation, the following improvements
to an OCFA like forensic framework design should be beneficial given that
the above disk-cache related issues are solved first:
• Integration of router functionality into the module framework.
• Integration of file-type module (libmagic) functionality into the module
framework.
• Meta-data separate from central database storage. No intermediate
mutable result storage in database.
• Use of more efficient serialization technology instead of XML.
Chapter 5
CarvPath as core paradigm
As discussed in the literature survey, CarvFS and ScalpelFS introduced the
concept of the use of a flat secondary-storage model. In CarvFS this model
was implemented through the use of so called CarvPath annotations. While
ScalpelFS used the flat secondary-storage model purely for carving in the
narrow sense, the use of CarvFS in the Sleuth-kit based modules of OCFA
showed that a flat secondary-storage model can be applicable to a much
wider range of embedded sub-entities within the computer-forensic process.
For clarity, some examples of flat secondary-storage model annotation possi-
bilities:
• A partition within a disk image.
• A file within a file-system as identified by file-system analysis forensic
tools.
• An area of unallocated space within a file-system.
• A carved file within an area of unallocated file-system space.
• A file within an ISO file.
• A file within a TAR archive.
• An email within a mailbox.
In fact, it is conceivable that we could find an email within a mailbox within
a TAR file within an ISO file carved within unallocated space within a file-
system within a partition of a disk image. CarvPath annotations as in-
troduced by CarvFS allow us to designate any such (possibly nested) piece
of data within a flat secondary address space. CarvPath annotations build
upon the concept of possibly nested structures like the one we just described.
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Each level of nesting is represented with a slash character in a way similar to
the use of this character as separator in a file-system path. In fact, CarvFS
uses this concept in order to map CarvPath annotations to pseudo files and
pseudo directories within a user space file-system. Within a single nesting
level, CarvPath defines two main types of tokens. Regular CarvPath to-
kens and so called long-path tokens. A regular CarvPath token consists of
one or more fragment tokens, separated by an underscore character. As it
is possible for a file to be highly fragmented, the length of a regular Carv-
Path token may end up exceeding the maximum size of a directory or file
name, and to address this, CarvPath has the concept of the long-path token.
Such a token consists of a secure hash of the regular CarvPath token that
is then stored in some global lookup table so that the original regular token
can always be restored from the long-path token. When we look at the frag-
ment tokens, we see two types of fragments. Regular fragments and sparse
fragments. A regular fragment is annotated using an offset and a size that
designate the location of the fragment within the parent-entity or nesting
level. The offset and size are ASCII encoded decimal numbers separated by
the plus character. Sometimes a file can be partially sparse. To accommo-
date that reality, CarvPath also allows for sparse fragments to be designated.
A sparse fragment starts with the capital S character followed by the size of
the sparse fragment. The following railroad diagram defines the CarvPath
format:
???
 
An example of a CarvPath could be:
0+1056964608/32256+4096_S24576_36352+4096.crv
If we take the use of a CarvFS alike system within a computer forensic
framework as a given way to designate and use flat secondary storage address
space, then the user-space file-system can become a cohesion providing cen-
tral component for the framework that elevates flat secondary storage address
space to a central paradigm that could help optimize for different page-cache
related bottlenecks. With the proper design, the user-space file-system can
keep track of the active data within the computer-forensic process, and can
play a pivotal role in many page-cache efficiency scenario’ s that we look at
in the next few sections.
Chapter 6
MattockFS design
considerations
In this chapter, the results of the remaining steps of the adopted approach
are discussed in detail. This is done by describing the outcome of the main
phases of the research related to the design considerations for the MattockFS
computer forensics file system as they relate to the solving of bottlenecks we
identified from the OCFA provenance logs and bottlenecks as well as anti-
forensic vulnerabilities identified in the analysis of the OCFA design. We
identify the following main phases from our adopted approach:
1. Investigating page-cache friendly archive interaction.
2. Investigating page-cache friendly message-bus interaction.
3. Investigating the potential and implementation possibilities for oppor-
tunistic hashing.
4. Investigating the requirements and possibilities for satisfying forensic
system-integrity needs.
5. Integration into a fully functional working proof of concept sub-system.
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6.1 Page-cache friendly archive interaction
Where CarvFS was initially designed to provide read-only access to individual
image files using a forensic-disk-image-format loadable-module in order to
allow access to EWF disk images, this concept ended up not scaling that
well to larger investigations spanning a large multitude of disk images and
demanding all these images to be simultaneously mounted. In later versions
of OCFA and CarvFS, a hack was used to allow images to be appended to an
already mounted archive. This archive was a collection of huge sparse files,
typically residing on SNFS volumes. The use of a single mount-point for an
archive allowed better RAM resource usage and better IO performance than
the use of a multitude of simultaneously mounted and on-the-fly decoded
EWF images. We choose to build further on these insights and look at the
possibilities for using such an archive in a page-cache friendly way.
In order to address page-cache friendliness, we should first look a bit at
the Linux kernel and the interaction between open files and the page cache.
Given that our archive shall consist of one or more huge sparse files that shall
be kept open by our user-space file-system, and given that multiple processes
shall be having pseudo-files opened within this user-space file-system, it is
important to know how open files and page-cache usage are related. The
Linux kernel will use part of its RAM as page-cache, where it will keep
part of the data from files that are in use and that were recently interacted
with available for consecutive reads. Such consecutive reads shall not require
additional disk IO when the data is still in the page-cache. Given that the
available RAM will be much smaller than the amount of file-data, the kernel
will need to pick what data to keep and what data to overwrite when other
file-data is accessed. The kernel will try to be as smart about these strategies
as is possible with the information it has available to it. With the fadvice
system call, a user space program such as our user-space file-system can
communicate information about the file it is accessing in order to help the
kernel in making wiser decisions with respect to the page-cache. As such, the
file-system can mark pieces of the archive as expected to be read again soon,
or as no longer needed.
A core functionality thus needed to improve page-cache performance is
keeping track of what parts of the archive are hot and what parts of the
archive are not. To determine this, we need to introduce a new concept, the
tool-chain. A piece of evidence data within the archive will typically pass
through a collection of different tools or modules before processing is done.
We say that hot archive data is data that is part of an active tool-chain.
Combining this with our page-cache related kernel interaction, it suffices
to say that any data that still is linked to an active tool-chain should be
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marked as hot regardless of any tool currently having a pseudo-file open for
that data. Data that does have pseudo-files open is hot as well. It may not
currently be getting processed, some process is accessing it still. This could
be a User Interface process for example. Thus as long as either an active tool-
chain exists for a CarvPath designated piece of archive, or if a pseudo file is
currently opened for that piece of archive, than that data is hot and should
be marked as such with the kernel. If neither of these conditions is true, than
the data is cold and this should be marked as such as to allow the kernel to
free up any page-cache. While the file-system should be perfectly capable
of keeping track of open pseudo-files, it is essential that we find a way to
also allow the file-system to know about tool-chains. With that information
the kernel can than be informed in such a way as to make best use of the
available page-cache assigned RAM.
If we know the amount of RAM available to the page-cache, and we know
the amount of hot data currently in the system, at some point we may reach
the situation where adding more hot data to the archive could be a bad idea.
There is no need to limit the amount of hot data to the available page-cache
RAM, but beyond a certain level of over-commitment, adding more hot data
to the archive becomes unwise and throttling of new archive data becomes
the better option. Implementing throttling within the archive file-system
itself would be a possible option, but putting too much functionality in the
file-system may not be wise. We thus choose to let the file-system provide
information to the framework in such a way that the framework becomes
capable of implementing throttling based on the page-cache load numbers
obtained from the archive file-system.
6.1.1 The CarvPath reference counting stack
Both active tool-chains and open pseudo-files result in all the data desig-
nated by a given CarvPath to be considered hot. In order to keep track
of hot CarvPaths, maintain indirect information about page-cache pressure,
and map the high-level CarvPath entities to low level kernel interaction oper-
ations, a way must be devised to keep track of the status of the low level data
chunks. To allow for this to be implemented a set-theory based combination
of operations on two administrative data structures was devised.
• For high level entity CarvPaths a reference counting map is used. Op-
erations that increment the reference count for a given CarvPath from
zero to one, and operations that decrement the reference count from
one to zero result in an operation on the lower level structure.
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• For lower level fragments, a stack of non-sparse CarvPath entities is
used as a way to reference-count lower level fragments. An operation
that increments the reference count for a given fragment from zero to
one, and operations that decrement the reference count from one to
zero result in a kernel interaction marking the fragment as active or
inactive.
The reference counting stack works by combining CarvPath operations with
set-theory operations. Each level in the stack contains a non-sparse CarvPath
entity representing a number of fragment with a reference count of at least
i+1, where i is the level on the stack. S0 represents all fragments with a
low-level reference count of at least one, S1 represents all fragments with a
low-level reference count of at least two and so on. We define two operations
on the stack involving high level CarvPath entities:
• Merge up: When a new CarvPath entity is added to the stack, its
fragments are merged up into the stack.
• Unmerge down: When a CarvPath entity is fully removed from the
stack, its fragments are unmerged down from the stack.
We look at both operations. Merge up starts with the full sparse-free version
of our new CarvPath entity and with the stack in its pre-merge state. We
shall describe our pre-merge stack in terms of S0..Sn−1 where n is the pre-
merge number of levels in the stack. Our post-merge stack shall be described
in terms of S ′0..S ′m−1 where m is the post-merge number of levels in the stack.
The initial sparse-free fragments in the CarvPath to be merged is designated
by C0. Consider F (X) to be the set of all byte locations designated by
CarvPath X, if we look at the actual merge up operation, for each i, starting
at zero, where : F (Ci) 6= ∅, we perform CarvPath operation so that:
• F (S ′i) = F (Ci) ∪ F (Si)
• F (Ci+1) = F (Ci) ∩ F (Si)
And for i=0, M being the area that we shall be marking as hot:
• F (M) = F (C0) \ F (S0)
When merge-up results in F (M) = ∅, that implies all data designated by
the CarvPath was already marked as hot, and should be considered a sub
entity of an active entity. Such a CarvPath entity is considered a candidate
for secondary opportunistic hashing, a subject covered in the next section of
this paper.
For the unmerge down operation, we start at i = m−1, where: F (Ci) 6= ∅,
we perform CarvPath operation so that:
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• F (S”i) = F (S ′i) \ F (Ci)
• F (Ci−1) = F (Ci) \ F (S ′i)
And for i=0, U being the area that we shall be marking as cold:
• F (U) = F (C0)
Finally, we can define the total size of all fragments of S0 as a measure of the
page-cache pressure for our archive. A number useful for throttling purposes.
By implementing a reference counting stack like this within the archive im-
plementation, the kernel is made aware of the intent of our framework with
respect to the usage of fragments within our flat secondary address space
archive and can use this information to allow for more efficient use of the
page cache. By exposing the total size of the ref-count>0 fragments within
the stack, the framework will have a useful marker to base a throttling strat-
egy for new data on, again helping to further reduce the amount of page-cache
misses within the system. In a next section we will look at more uses for the
reference counting stack and it’s potential role in optimizing performance in
cooperation with a message-bus solution.
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6.2 Opportunistic hashing
In the previous section we discussed the low-level versus high-level archive in-
teraction in terms of CarvPath fragments and page-cache interaction. In our
evaluation of the OCFA bottlenecks, we discovered that many spurious reads
were the result of early hashing, performed in order to facilitate the Content
address Storage (CAS) needs of OCFA. Given that content hashing is such
a common operation, and given that, using an efficient hashing algorithm
in many current day settings, hashing operations are many times cheaper
than spurious disk-IO. We look at the concept of introducing opportunistic
hashing to our archive implementation. The primary goal for opportunistic
hashing is reducing the time between first access and last access, and thus
the total lifetime of the data within the system, by delaying the first read and
combining it with hashing, thus potentially avoiding spurious IO operations.
If we can hash the data as a side effect of data already being read for other
purposes, then some spurious reads may be avoided.
6.2.1 Using the right hashing algorithm
Due to legacy and performance concerns, most forensic tools up until to-
day use hashing algorithms that from a cryptographical point of view should
be considered deprecated. Many other hashing functions, while being more
secure are less suitable due to their software performance properties. As out-
lined in appendix C, we have investigated suitable available options and de-
velopment with regards to collision resistance of commonly used algorithms.
The conclusion was that both MD5 and SHA1 are currently effectively dep-
recated for use within the context of an automated computer forensic frame-
work, and that SHA2 and SHA3 are sub-optimal replacements when it comes
to performance and scalability. We found a very suitable replacement algo-
rithm in BLAKE2 and as outlined in appendix C advocate the wide adoption
of BLAKE2 into the computer-forensic process.
6.2.2 Primary opportunistic hashing
Primary opportunistic hashing aims to prevent premature reads that might
unnecessarily increase page-cache pressure, and limit the amount of page-
cache misses by eliminating hashing geared IO read operations. A second
part of the opportunistic hashing function revolves around the idea of simul-
taneously having multiple nested hot CarvPath entities, and accessing these
in a sequential manner with respect to location within the flat secondary-
storage address space as defined with CarvPath annotations. That way, if a
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piece of data is read from or written to the archive file, that piece of data
might contribute not only to the hashing of the high-level pseudo-file that
is being accessed at that particular time, but also to the hashing of nested
children of that entity, or of the parent entity in which the current entity is
nested. This however is not the primary projected benefit of opportunistic
hashing. The main benefit is that a CarvPath entity traversing its tool-chain
will often end up having its content partially or fully hashed by preceding
tools as a result of hashing opportunistically on low-level IO operations, be-
fore the moment that explicit hashing might end up being actually needed.
Many small files for example may get hashed completely resulting from file
type checking. To allow for opportunistic hashing, every hot CarvPath is
added to an archive wide opportunistic hash collection. This collection will
hold active BLAKE2 hashing state and in-CarvPath hashing offset informa-
tion for every hot CarvPath in the collection. When low level IO takes place
within the archive, the block of data is offered to each of the opportunistic
hash objects in the archive. If the offset and size of the IO operation match
the current hashing offset of the entity, the relevant part of the data is used
to further the hashing process for the given CarvPath.
6.2.3 Secondary opportunistic hashing
As mentioned in the previous section about page-cache friendly archive in-
teraction, CarvPath entities that in a reference-counting-stack merge-up op-
eration don’t result in any new hot data being added, are candidates for
secondary opportunistic hashing. All the data in the CarvPath entity is al-
ready marked as hot, and could potentially already reside in the page-cache.
The Linux incore system call allows checking if a file chunk fully resides in
the page-cache, or does not. If a chunk of data resides in the page-cache,
then reading it will fetch it from page-cache without any actual IO taking
place. We define secondary opportunistic hashing as the process whereby all
leading incore fragments of a candidate, as identified by a reference-counting-
stack merge-up operation, are actively read by the archive implementation
and are used in opportunistic hashing operations. The strategy of secondary
opportunistic hashing could be particularly useful for carving-generated sub-
entities. Carving is usually done using sequential reads on a parent entity.
When a sub-entity is identified by a carving tool and submitted as sub entity
to the messaging subsystem, the whole child CarvPath entity will have been
read very recently and the likelihood of it still residing in page-cache would
be very high. This means that the child entity could be hashed using read
operations that don’t translate to any actual IO operations on the underlying
secondary storage technology.
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6.3 Page-cache friendly message-bus interac-
tion
Where the archive implementation allows the page-cache efficient use of ac-
tive hot data and provides the framework with information that could be
used for throttling purposes, neither of these measures will have any impact
on the out-flow interaction. The OCFA timing analysis revealed that the
priority queuing mechanism used by the OCFA messaging sub-system was
ineffective at reducing the average volume normalized lifetime of data within
the system, a parameter that is rather important for page-cache efficiency.
As such, reevaluation of job prioritization should prove very important. Due
to logistic dependencies, a full investigation of optimum job prioritization
falls outside of the scope of the achievable goals of this research. We did
however look at providing different prioritization and other performance and
scalability geared facilities that should provide essential handles for future
research and system development in this area.
6.3.1 Actor job picking policies
Given that we have elevated the flat address-space secondary storage model
and the use of CarvPath annotations to a central paradigm for computer
forensic framework implementation. Given also the existence of both the
reference counting stack and the opportunistic hash collection, it should be
possible to integrate part of the knowledge from these facilities into an alter-
native to the failing static priority queue concept. We propose that replacing
the priority queues in the Anycast message-bus system with sortable sets
or sets that allow for selective picking according to a picking policy. Given
that different modules in the tool-chains have different properties with re-
spect to data access patterns, data IO versus CPU usage, etc, it is likely
that there could be benefits to using different picking strategies for different
modules. Another variable relevant to picking policies is page-cache pres-
sure. If current page-cache usage is high, then other picking policies may be
more appropriate than when page-cache usage is relatively low. Given the
potentially available CarvPath and opportunistic hashing related attributes,
a set of possible picking policies can be defined for our Anycast message-bus
sets:
• Highest reference count: The idea behind this policy is related to oppor-
tunistic hashing. Using this policy will prioritize entities that contain
data fragments that are shared between the highest number of entities.
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Reading any such entity would have a high probability of contributing
to the opportunistic hashing of multiple other entities.
• Lowest opportunistic hashing offset: Given that regular hashing hap-
pens sequentially, it can be beneficial if entities are processed in order
of opportunistic hashing adjusted offset. This in order to minimize
hashing mismatches resulting from data beyond the current hashing
offset of a file.
• Reference count of one: Prefer entities that contain fragments with a
reference count of one. This policy is aimed at short-term outflow.
After data with a reference count of one is processed by a module that
doesn’ t produce any new child entities, this data will be completely
done after module completion, allowing it to be marked as cold. This
could make room in the page-cache to allow throttling to discontinue
and new data to be submitted into the archive.
• Highest density of ref-count one data: The idea of this policy is that this
will give precedence to processing operations that will free up substan-
tial amounts of page-cache relative to the amount of data processed.
• Lowest density of maximum ref-count data: The idea of this policy is
that entities containing large amounts of the highest ref-count data are
less likely to free up much of the page-cache in the short run.
• Lowest weighted average ref-count: An other policy aimed at cumula-
tive effect. The idea is that using the weighted average ref-count may
possibly produce a better overall outflow, rather than focusing purely
on ref-count of one.
• Smallest data-size: The idea behind processing small entities first is
that small entities could potentially grow the size of the Anycast sets to
the point where the sorting or picking overhead becomes a bottleneck
in its own right. To avoid this, prioritizing small (fast) entities over
larger ones could keep the picking process responding sufficiently fast.
We allow the above policies to be chained, and allow each module to set and
update its own picking policy.
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Figure 6.1: Dependencies
6.3.2 Message-bus/Archive integration
In the job picking policies we identified the need to use information about
CarvPath designated entities that is maintained within the reference counting
stack and opportunistic hashing layer of the data archive. After evaluating
the required information exchange between the Anycast message bus and the
archive with respect to the implementation of job picking, it became clear
that information exchange would make up a level of overhead that would
make performant and scalable messaging infeasible. Due to data-structure
dependencies as shown in figure 6.1 on page 47, the Anycast message-
bus, implementation of the job picking policies needs to be integrated with
the archive in order for both to be able to work effectively and efficiently
with both opportunistic hashing state and the reference counting stack. By
integrating these two, the message-bus solution becomes part of the same
user-space file-system that implements the data archive solution. By choosing
this approach however, the message-bus in essence becomes a local message
bus and scalability concerns for the message bus become a reality. There are
two possible approaches to address scalability concerns for the message bus.
The suitability of these possibilities depends on aspects of the distributed
setup for the archive solution. If we look at archive scalability to a multiple
node setup, there are two main options for distributed access to a single
archive:
• Running multiple instances of the file-system on top of a Storage Area
Network (SAN) solution that provides for a shared-access file-system
such as SNFS.
• Running an NFS mesh-up with one local archive per node that is shared
with all other nodes over NFS.
Analysis of the archive/message-bus integration setup has revealed that both
solutions come with their own specific challenges with respect to scalability
of the message-bus part of things.
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Message-bus in SAN setup
In the SAN archive setup, each node will have its own user-space file-system
running on top of the raw archive files. This has the advantage for the
archive part of things that both the file-system and page-cache information
on that one node are maintained on a per-node basis without the need for
additional record keeping on the side of the file-system implementation. the
page-cache is local, the file-system is local, all fits seamlessly with respect to
the archive side of things and page-cache optimized file-system access. Direct
messaging between nodes however is not possible and additional facilities are
needed to allow for jobs to be exchanged between nodes when such a thing
becomes desirable for scalability reasons. We identify the need for a load-
balancing facility in our message-bus implementation that could be used in
the implementation of a cross-node mesh-up implementation.
Message-bus in NFS setup
As with the SAN solution, with NFS each node will have its own user-space
file-system running on top of the raw archive files. Using an NFS mesh-up
though, the file-system where the archive exists will be local for one node
and remote for all other nodes. It is suggested that each node uses files on a
local file-system for primary (non load-balancing) processing. NFS mounted
archives should be used primarily for serving load-balancing needs. Again
we identify the need for a load-balancing facility in our message-bus.
Minimal data-move based scalability
Whenever a chunk of data moves from a tool or module on one node, to a
tool or module on another node, this move effectively equates a page-cache
miss. As such, we consider a node-move to be a relatively expensive oper-
ation that should not occur unless the move is beneficial to the distributed
processing to the extent that the price of the page-cache miss can be justi-
fied. Hot data should by default stick to being processed on the same node.
When data migrates, the new node should become the new sticky node, min-
imizing the total amount of data moves and allowing the overloaded node to
appropriately clean up page-cache after a data move. When there is imbal-
ance between the load of different nodes, a move of data must be considered.
Given the price of a page-cache miss implied by a data move, migration poli-
cies are very important for effective load balancing. We thus identify the need
of job picking policies geared specifically at job migration for load balancing
purposes.
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6.3.3 Load balancing support
We identified the need for a load balancing facility for multi=server setups.
Given the integration of the message-bus and the availability of job picking
policies, it is logical to implement this facility in terms of message-bus con-
sumer and message-bus producer operations. The concept of load-balancing
within our solution is that the user-space file-system allows for a tool-chain
to be prematurely abandoned on one file-system instance to then be newly
instantiated on an other file-system instance. Given the availability of per
module job-picking, we choose to implement our load-balancing facility in
terms of extended job picking. We identify the concept of module-picking
policies. The load balancing facility running on top of the user-space file-
system should for example be able to pick a job from a module that is known
to be CPU intensive. We define the following module-set attributes that the
framework may set for load balancing purposes:
• Module weight: This attribute is meant as a measure of how CPU
intensive the operations of a module are.
• Set overflow threshold: This attribute is meant to set a set-size thresh-
old. Only if the set-size reaches this threshold will migration be con-
sidered.
Based on these set attributes, the size of the set and volume of entities
referred to in the set, a non-empty set will be picked using a given module
set picking policies. We define the following policies:
• Weight: Pick the set with the highest module weight attribute value.
• Count : Pick the set with the highest number of entities.
• Volume: Pick the set with the highest total size of all entities combined.
• W × C
V
: Pick a set with small yet CPU intensive jobs.
As with the job picking policies, these policies can be chained. They are also
combined with the job picking policies. A policy for load balancing could be:
Pick the job with the highest density of ref-count-one data from the module
with highest job count from the module sets that share the highest weight.
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6.3.4 Hooks for a distributed FIVES router
In the analysis of tool-chain commonality in OCFA, we identified that many
entities are discarded after digest and file-type checks. In the analysis of
OCFA bottlenecks, the central router had quite a dominant position in that
its centralized nature doubled the amount of message-bus interactions. If
every module process comes with both built-in file-type module function-
ality and a built-in OCFA-style router, then we would reap the following
performance gains:
• Unsupported file-types would not need to be routed at all; No messages.
• No need for doubling message. Each module sends message directly to
the next module, halving the amount of Anycast messages.
In OCFA the router used a growing provenance-log blob to determine the
next tool in the tool-chain to forward a data entity to. The FIVES project
introduced a replacement router for OCFA. the FIVES router used the OCFA
provenance log to store rule-list state that would be used the next time the
provenance-log was presented to the router. The concept of the FIVES router
was a very powerful tool allowing for the expression of complex tool-chain
rules. This is a concept that is important to preserve and accommodate in
our message-bus solution. The solution OCFA offered to the FIVES router,
for performance reasons, must be considered not to be a viable one. The
use of a large per-tool-chain mutable provenance log containing all mod-
ule meta-data and being updated by each consecutive module has major IO
performance issues. We advocate instead the separation of the core prove-
nance log from meta-data collection, and the use of immutable storage for
meta-data exchange. If we treat evidence data and evidence meta-data the
same from an archive and messaging point of view, we can devise a minimal
messaging format that does away with the need to interact with the large
mutable meta-data provenance log blobs. Looking at the minimum needs for
both modules and a potential new FIVES style router with statefull rule-list,
we can define our core message format as being made up of five distinct and
relatively small fields:
• CarvPath: The CarvPath that designated the immutable data or meta-
data this message refers to.
• Mime-Type : The mime-type of the data or meta-data this message
refers to.
• File extension: A file extension for the CarvPath to facilitate the next
tool.
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• Next Module: The name of the tool or module functionality that this
message is to be handled by.
• Router state: A string representing all the rule-list traversal state that
the next router functionality instance may need, in order to continue
rule-list traversal for this tool-chain.
It is up to the implementation of the new router functionality to minimize
the size requirements of the router-state string without compromising the ex-
pressiveness of the rule-list. Ideally the expressiveness should be high enough
for implementing the rule-list description as a domain specific language. It is
important to note that in the proposed setup, non-provenance related meta-
data extraction is to be submitted directly to some kind of data store module.
As there should no longer be a need to use per tool-chain meta-data blobs,
a dissecting module producing multiple child entities may choose to consol-
idate the meta-data for multiple child entities in a single meta-data storage
entity, further reducing the amount of Anycast messages in the system.
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6.4 Forensic system-integrity needs
As identified in the literature survey, in the light of overall system robustness,
the reality of anti forensics and the provable correctness and repeatability of
the provenance information, system integrity needs have changed quit a bit
since OCFA was incepted. Part of these integrity requirements fitted within
the scope of the research project and complemented the performance and
scalability geared subject of this paper, while other parts did not. As our lit-
erature survey showed, the chain of custody requires guarding of provenance
information and requires facilities that safeguard the integrity of the data.
What the literature survey did not reveal is the realization that the chain
of custody does not end when the data reaches the lab. The forensic data
in a computer forensics framework is processed with a wide range of tools
from a multitude of authors. Given the reality of anti-forensic techniques,
and given the reality of software bugs, we must consider the scenario that
seized data might either crash a tool in a relatively benign way, or in the
worst case might actually end up executing an exploit against one of the
tools in the tool-chain. Even an non-exploit crash might in extreme cases
end up corrupting the results of a framework such as OCFA. While stopping
tool crashes and exploits from happening isn’t a viable goal, minimizing the
potential impact of such an event is. Some measures could be taken at a
framework and system logistic level by means of Mandatory Access Control
(MAC), IP firewall rules and the use of different user accounts for the dif-
ferent tools in the tool-chain. These fall outside of the scope of this research
project. Other concerns however can be considered useful features for our
integrated archive and message-bus solution.
6.5 Frozen immutable CarvPath data
We already established that mutable data had IO performance issues and
the use of immutable write-once data could be beneficial to overall system
performance. There is however also a major anti-forensic invulnerability
advantage to technically implementing immutability. Data that is made im-
mutable immediately after creation in a technically secure way can no longer
be changed. If a tool, due to a bug, ends up trying to corrupt existing
data, an immutability facility will stop this from occurring. Given that our
archive is implemented as a user-space file-system, running this file-system
as a different user than the modules should keep these modules from directly
corrupting any raw archive data. The only access to the archive data is
through the file-system. A file-system that we implement in such a way that
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only new data (kick-start or derived data) is temporarily mutable during cre-
ation. Once the new data is forwarded to a next tool in the tool-chain, the
file-system will deny any further attempts at changing the data. This means
that both data and meta-data, after creation, become completely invulner-
able to any type of data corruption attempts. Only the creating module
should be capable, when compromised, to create bogus output. The result:
the impact of a bug on actual evidence (meta)data is reduced to an absolute
minimum.
6.6 Trusted provenance logs
In OCFA, the modules themselves were responsible for provenance logging.
The Provenance log was bundled with all the extracted meta-data in a mu-
table database BLOB that was updated by each consecutive module. By
making all data storage per-module write-once, most of the integrity con-
cerns are alleviated. Write-once, however, does not keep a module from
either not reporting or lying about provenance information. The file-system
message bus functionality has the ability to keep track of the actual prove-
nance information. With the file-system running as a different user as the
modules, this means that the file-system is fully capable of maintaining the
provenance logs in an out of band way and writing them to a file or database
inaccessible to regular modules. There should be no need to trust the dif-
ferent modules to be honest about their own provenance information. The
file-system does provenance logging and no compromised tool will be able to
intervene with the integrity of the file-system generated provenance logs.
6.7 Use of sparse capabilities
Combining the two facilities above, we have the core ingredients for provid-
ing a future computer forensics framework with the lab-side equivalent of a
Sealed Digital Evidence Bag (SDEB). There are however still some access
control issues that must be addressed. The base concept is that each module
that derives either child data or meta data from an input entity, is able to
create and seal a new virtual evidence bag by writing and when doing so, im-
plicitly linking the child/parent relation of new data to the old data. In order
to implement this possibility, we shall be relying partially on the assumption
that a future full solution will be combining MAC with the solution we are
offering. The way we allow for SDEB equivalence, is by providing a special
file-system based API to the framework modules. A file-system based API
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that builds upon the concept of sparse capabilities. Sparse capabilities are
unguessable strings that both designate an object and allow access to that
object. You can think of sparse capabilities as unguessable object names
doubling as passwords for accessing those same objects. The following out-
lines the sparse capability based API that, when combined with MAC, the
provenance log and immutability facilities should create a good line of de-
fense against most forms of integrity compromising anti-forensic attacks or
non-hostile yet potentially corrupting tool crash events.
• Instance cap :A tool or module process can register itself as an instance
or worker of a certain module/tool. When it does this ,it receives a
sparse capability that links its operations to the provenance logs and
provides an entry point to other file-system operations. The use of
MAC to limit a module to only register as itself is strongly advised.
• Job cap Using the above instance cap, a tool can set some attributes
such as job picking policy. After this it can ask the message-bus for
a job to process. This job will be provided in the form of a second
sparse capability. Accepting the new job will add an entry to the in-
process provenance log for the tool-chain that this job is a part of. The
job capability can be used to retrieve router state for the framework
routing logic, it can be used to forward the current job to the a next
tool in the tool-chain, and it can be used to create and submit child
entities.
• New data cap Using the above Job capability, a child storage entity
can be created. Creating a child storage entity will yield a new-data
capability. This capability allows read/write access to a new fixed-
size area of archive storage space that can be used either for child
data or extracted meta-data to be stored. After writing the data has
completed, the new entity can be frozen and submitted to a tool in the
tool-chain.
The use of these three types of sparse capabilities provide a semi-secure
file-system based API that provides for message-bus and data-entry capa-
bilities. Given some fundamental cross-process insecurities with the Linux
/proc filesystem, more MAC measures should be considered to make the
use of these sparse capabilities secure against truly advanced anti-forensics
attacks. This however falls outside the scope of this paper.
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6.8 MattockFS; a proof of concept
Next to the research outcomes described in this chapter, an important piece
of result from our research project is a fully functional proof of concept of
the combined archive and message bus solution as a user space file-system.
The FUSE file-system MattockFS combines almost all features described in
this chapter. Due to the time constraints of this research project, this ini-
tial proof of concept was implemented in the programming language Python.
We assume the performance to currently still be sub optimal due to language
choice, job picking policy algorithms and the specific BLAKE2 algorithms
available from Python, that all have not been optimized for speed. Function-
ally though, the proof of concept has most functionality that a production-
ripe version will need to possess apart from some minor points of possible
improvement. The proof of concept implements the full archive functional-
ity and sparse-cap based file-system API, for what we also implemented a
python wrapper API. The implementation of a lab-side SDEB equivalent is
completely operational in the proof of concept. Most of the message bus
functionality is operational, although job picking algorithms may not be op-
timally implemented with respect to processing efficiency. A feature that
would allow messaging state to be restored from the provenance log would
have been desirable, making the message-bus solution equivalent to the per-
sistent priority queue solution that the OCFA Anycast relay used. Stopping
and re-starting an incomplete run is not currently part yet of the proof of con-
cept implementation. Primary opportunistic hashing has been implemented.
Secondary opportunistic hashing, though, has not. Test code coverage for
the current code-base, at over 90% should be considered sufficient to have
confidence in the correct workings of the current proof of concept implemen-
tation.
Chapter 7
Evaluation and discussion of
results
From a purely research oriented perspective, the viability of creating the
foundation for an OCFA inspired next generation scalable message passing
concurrency computer forensics framework suitable for both academic re-
search and full scale criminal investigations that addresses the page-cache
and system integrity concerns identified, has mostly been shown in this re-
search project, and most of the research questions have been answered in
a satisfactory way. Some questions about the practical interaction of dif-
ferent individually useful partial solutions however remain as challenges for
future research and implementation. The proof of concept created in this
research project shows the viability of the proposed facilities. There remain
however scalability, performance and robustness concerns that shall need to
be addressed in future work. Lacking other interacting framework compo-
nents, not everything can fully be evaluated until a framework is created and
realistic interaction can be objectively evaluated.
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7.1 Evaluation of design and implementation
In this section, part of the design and implementation of the MattockFS
proof of concept is evaluated. It must be noted that the complete evaluation
of MattockFS would require a fully functional computer forensic framework
complete with a set of modules. Lacking these, we need to limit this evalu-
ation to those part of the design and implementation that can be evaluated
without these components being available.
7.1.1 Evaluation of data-input
The MattockFS code-base includes a tool for importing forensic disk images
in the EWF file format, This tool, ewf2mattock uses the python ewf library
and the python MattockFS API library to copy the data contained in an
EWF file into a MattockFS archive. To evaluate the MattockFS data-input
functionality, we create a simple python script that basically converts an
EWF file to a raw DD file using the python EWF library. Using a 10GB EWF
image file representing a 40GB disk image, we compare the time required to
run ewf2mattock with the time required for the simple script. We do this
for systems with three different classes of CPU’s in order to look for a trend
with respect to CPU power available.
CPU ewf2dd.py ewf2mattock overhead throughput
Core 2 Duo 11:33 40:57 255% 133 Mbps
AMD A6 10:02 29:39 197% 184 Mbps
XEON E5 6:08 17:06 177% 320 Mbps
In this evaluation we notice the overhead of MattockFS with respect to data
input is very high. We however also see that the overhead becomes signif-
icantly smaller as CPU power increases. This suggests that improvement
of CPU efficiency of the MattockFS implementation, for example by reim-
plementing MattockFS in C++, might, for representable server hardware,
reduce the overhead of data input to a level that would not end up making
MattockFS a bottleneck on data input over, for example a 1Gbps network
connection. We must conclude that for use on lower range CPUs, the cur-
rent implementation data input overhead should be considered prohibitive,
and that the CPU requirements for acceptable performance with the current
code-base are relatively high.
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7.1.2 Evaluation of opportunistic hashing
For evaluating opportunistic hashing in MattockFS, we again use three dif-
ferent computers with a different class of CPU. As OCFA used SHA1 and
MattockFS makes use of BLAKE2 in Python, we look at the following:
• sha1sum on the raw archive file
• b2sum on the raw archive file
• blake2 on the raw archive file using the python API
• reading from MattockFS
We notice that only on the low spec CPU system, there is any notable dif-
ference in the time needed to perform these tasks using the different tools.
Both the increase in speed between sha1sum and b2sum, and the consid-
erable overhead in the python implementation of BLAKE2 are reduced to
insignificant numbers on the two more performant CPUs. On the XEON E5
based system, each of the above runs took 5:22 ± 0:02. A second part of the
evaluation of MattockFS opportunistic hashing lies in answering the question
how the opportunistic hashing scales. Again, a full evaluation would require
a complete working computer forensic framework that would run on top of
MattockFS, but we can do a set of simple tests to determine how MattockFS
opportunistic hashing scales to higher levels of data overlap. To do this, we
open a number of files that span almost the complete size of the 41GB disk
image and time the amount of time it takes to read the whole disk image.
Figure 7.1 on page 59 shows the results of these tests.
7.1.3 Evaluation of job picking policies
The most performance sensitive part of MattockFS is the AnyCast message-
bus implementation. While adding messages to the message-bus is straight
forward, selecting the best job from a set uses one or more rather scalabil-
ity sensitive job picking policies. The scalability is determined by the time
required for picking a job from the set at different set sizes. To test the
scalability properties of different job picking policies, we first fill an AnyCast
set with a large number of messages and then fetch all the jobs in the set
using the given policy recording the time needed for fetching a single mes-
sage. In this evaluation we used the XEON E5 setup only. One particular
policy stood out in such a negative way that it was needed to scale down the
whole experiment for that specific policy. The current implementation of the
d policy, a policy that prefers jobs with the lowest possible density of chunks
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Figure 7.1: Opportunistic hashing overlap scaling
Figure 7.2: Message picking scaling for policy d
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Figure 7.3: Message picking scaling for policy W/r/D
with a ref-count higher than one, performed so poorly that a different set-
size range was needed to perform a useful performance and scalability test.
The graph for this policy, shown in figure 7.2 on page 59, shows not only
that performance degrades quickly at just a few dozen messages in the set,
but also that message picking time follows an exponential curve. While it is
likely that implementation in C++ would attenuate the poor performance
of the implementation, the exponential nature of the performance curve is
still a strong indicator that this would not increase the threshold of the set-
size where this policy becomes unusable by much. The W, r and D policies,
displayed in figure 7.3 on page 60, are not as poorly performant as the d
policy, and should be usable if throttling is used to keep the maximum num-
ber of messages in a set below a reasonable but possibly restrictive threshold.
each of these three policies yields a performance graph with a distinctly ex-
ponential shape. It is suggested that future research should look into the
algorithms for the above four policies and investigate if better policy scala-
bility can be achieved with alternative picking policies. The remaining four
policies, shown in figure 7.4 on page 61, have scalability properties that are
good in two ways. Not only do they all show relatively decent performance
for relatively large set sizes, they do so with what approximates a straight
line. For these policies, it is likely that a C++ implementation should yield
a truly high-performance local message-bus implementation.
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Figure 7.4: Message picking scaling for policies D/S/O/R/H
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7.1.4 Evaluation of hash/file-type switch
In the final part of the MattockFS evaluation we look at the order of file-type
determination and file hashing and evaluate what that could mean for one
of the investigations from our OCFA timing analysis. While this analysis
is purely a logical one based on a simplified model, the result should be
indicative of expectable reduction in reads. If we look at investigation A
from our OCFA timing analysis, we can extract the file size of all files that:
• Pass through the digest module only.
• Pass through both the digest and the file module but no other modules.
• Pass through both digest and file module before being forwarded to an
other module.
Depending on mount options and defaults, a file-type check will read either
32k, 64k or 128k of data. Applying this to the file sizes above, we can
determine how many data blocks would be read by an initial file-type check,
and how much will remain to be (un)read after that. Unfortunately we don’t
have the data to know if the files that match black/white-list matching would
have matched a file-type check. As such we consider three scenarios:
• File-type split for non white/black-list files is representative for white/black-
list files.
• All non white/black-list files have a file type that needs further pro-
cessing.
• None of the non white/black-list files require any further file-type de-
pendent processing.
Finally, the upper and lower bound of blocks eventually red assuming that
all or respectively none of the blocks of forwarded files are eventually read by
the following modules. The following table shows the results of this analysis:
Scenario Min/Max 32k 64k 128k
None Min 10% 18% 31%
None Max 23% 30% 40%
Representative Min 8% 15% 26%
Representative Max 23% 29% 38%
All Min 12% 23% 40%
All Max 37% 45% 57%
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It is important to note that reducing the block size for FUSE based read op-
eration, while significantly reducing spurious reads in these scenario’s, doing
so will also increase the overall number of user space kernel space switches
for the FUSE file-system, greatly increasing FUSE file-system overhead. As
such, we can conservatively conclude that the reduction of spurious reads
should roughly be between 43% and 69%. It might be possible to reduce
it further, possibly to a figure between 63% and 90%, but at substantially
increased numbers of kernel/user-space switches. Determining if this tradeoff
is worth it should be considered subject of further study.
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7.2 answers to the research questions
The historic page-cache related bottlenecks within the OCFA have been lo-
cated and different ways of addressing these bottlenecks in a future frame-
work have been identified and evaluated individually. The usefulness of the
flat secondary-storage address-space model in respect to solving page-cache
related bottlenecks has been shown, as has the possibility of an opportunis-
tic form of hashing. The anti-forensic weaknesses of the OCFA architecture
have been identified and to a great extent addressed and demonstrated in our
proof of concept. It was shown that the use of sparse capabilities, combined
with a file-system based API, can provide an important, yet not a complete,
solution for addressing these issues. We have shown with our proof of con-
cept implementation that each of the concerns mentioned can be addressed
and implemented within a computer-forensics framework component. Lack-
ing other components for a forensic framework, spurious read reduction could
not be reliablly quantifies.
7.3 From proof of concept to operational sys-
tem
While all of the research questions have been addressed, the current proof of
concept is not yet fully suitable as foundational component of a future next
generation computer-forensic framework. We propose that the following is
needed in order to turn the current proof of concept into a production ready
implementation:
• Restore state from journal: While the current implementation main-
tains a journal log file that in theory could be used to allow the mes-
saging subsystem to pick up where it left off after a restart, restore
from journal isn’t currently implemented. Implementing this would ef-
fectively give MattockFS the same atomic persistence that the OCFA
Anycast had.
• Implement temporary-quarantine facility: In OCFA, the Anycast im-
plemented a quarantine facility for data that would crash a module.
This facility, that OCFA implemented in the form of the never priority
allowed the investigation to keep running while maintenance program-
mers would fix the module. Research is needed into the possibility of
implementing a similar data quarantine functionality in MattockFS.
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• Port MattockFS to C++: While Python is a good programming lan-
guage for prototyping, our evaluation has shown that the implementa-
tion is relatively slow with respect to import and possibly messaging.
This slowness could potentially partially nullify part of the performance
benefits from the page-cache and opportunistic hashing. Rewriting it
in C++ is likely to lead to a much faster implementation.
• Move to BLAKE2bp: The current implementation uses a Python mod-
ule without support for the parallel multi-core BLAKE2bp implemen-
tation. With just one file-system on a node for a given archive, this
would mean at most one core could be working on opportunistic hash-
ing for the whole node, possibly creating a hashing bottleneck for the
system. Implementing BLAKE2bp, either by patching the BLAKE2
python module code, or by moving to C++ and appropriate library
could remove that potential bottleneck.
• Re-factor sorting to picking: While the picking policies are suitable for
a proof of concept, some policies have shown to have poor scalability
properties in their current implementation. It is likely that moving
from a sorting type algorithm to a more picking oriented algorithm
would lead to a more efficient picking process for some of these policies,
especially for larger sets.
• Implement and evaluate secondary opportunistic hashing : Secondary
incore based opportunistic hashing could potentially greatly improve
the interaction between carving and opportunistic hashing.
• Write ports of the base API to C++ Next to Python, C++ should be
considered an important language for writing modules in. The current
Python wrapper API for access to the file-system based archive and
messaging API should also be ported to C++.
• Redis and privilege separation: The current implementation of Mat-
tockFS uses REDIS as in-memory distributed storage for CarvPath
long-path entries. The use of a Redis server for distributed CarvPath
long-path storage is currently an Achilles’ heel in the access control
model of MattockFS. It may be necessary to rethink this part of Mat-
tockFS to remove this potential vulnerability.
• Mandatory access control: Without limiting access to /proc in an ef-
fective way, the sparse capability based API might be compromised
through capabilities that could be snooped from other processes through
pseudo files in the /proc hierarchy that give access to process internals
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including open files. Using AppArmor or SELinux, access to these
pseudo files could be effectively prohibited. Further, in a directed anti-
forensic attack against MattockFS, a running module might spawn a
child process that could register under the name of an other module.
Again a threat that could be removed by using AppArmor or SELinux
for MAC.
• Framework fadvise hooks: Different file-types can have file-type specific
processing and expected access patterns. It is likely that providing
hooks for allowing the framework to predict such patterns could allow
the file-system to set smarter fadvise values that might further reduce
spurious reads and improve page-cache efficiency.
• Fuse read-block size: As we identified in our evaluation of file/digest
order, reducing the read block-size for FUSE could potentially greatly
reduce the amount of spurious reads, but at the expense of file-system
overhead. This should be evaluated and if worth the price, implemented
into MattockFS.
7.4 Towards a complete framework
In appendix D, an outline of a possible computer forensic framework on
top of MattockFS is described. The base idea would be that asynchronous-
framework based processes will be used as module instances or workers.
These processes would combine shared framework logic with module spe-
cific code. The framework logic should, next to functionality for serialization,
evidence tree walking and logic for communicating with MattockFS, also con-
tain FIVES like routing logic and file-type checking functionality (libmagic).
The combination of MattockFS and these processes should make for a single
node forensic framework implementation. Secondly a load balancing mesh-
up should be added. That mesh-up would be working on load-balancing of
initial disk-image kick-starts, but also work in the limited migration of jobs
between different nodes for load balancing purposes.
7.5 Other future work
While the job picking policies, the reference counting stack, and the use of
opportunistic hashing have each been examined in isolation, the policies and
their interaction with both opportunistic hashing and page-cache efficiency
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can only truly be evaluated when a full framework implementation is avail-
able and a real set of disk images is processed by a real set of modules. As
such, only after the completion of a complete framework together with the
most essential modules, the results from the currently concluded research
could fully be evaluated. Especially the interaction between opportunistic
hashing and page-cache hit oriented features and policies.It is suggested that
a profiling and evaluation run, such as done on OCFA within this research
project, should be conducted after completion of a full framework with its
base modules. This profiling should look at the different available policies and
evaluate each for its merits and performance characteristics. It is likely that
such research would yield new insights on the interaction of opportunistic
hashing and page-cache strategy possibilities that could combine to arrive at
strategies aimed at optimum overall IO performance and a minimum of spu-
rious reads. Part off the effective interaction between the module framework
and MattockFS relies on the throttling implementation in the framework. A
suitable throttling policy is yet to be devised and devising such a policy in
a way that neither under- nor over-commits is considered the most crucial
piece of algorithmic design that is yet to be conducted. Currently MattockFS
only uses two states to mark archive-file-chunks. The fadvise function defines
additional states that might be useful. For example a state that marks a hot
section for sequential access. Exploring the use of other state markers could
potentially further improve page-cache efficiency. Further, MattockFS cur-
rently only knows two values for the status of a CarvPath fragment. Either
it is hot or it is cold. Hot could currently mean two things:
• The data has been read before, likely in page-cache and will be accessed
again. (hot)
• The data is part of designated area that has not actually been read yet
but will likely be read in the near future. (warm)
Exploring the possibilities of differentiating between these two could consti-
tute an area of useful future research. Finally there is the subject of non
sequential access. Non-sequential access to the parts of a data entity is
undesirable from an opportunistic hashing perspective, but will not always
be avoidable. There might be some merit in the use of Merkle-tree based
file-hashing that would allow opportunistic hashing to take place even with
non-sequential access patterns. It is unknown, due to the greater amount
of required state and the unknown access patterns for different file-types, if
the effect of Merkle-tree hashing could yield a beneficial result. This is a
potential subject for further research.
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7.6 Recommendation
The recommendation of this author is to continue work and research on the
creation of a future open-source computer-forensic framework. The work
done for the MattockFS proof of concept could act as a first step towards
such a framework and the insights gained with respect to page-cache effi-
ciency and access control could also benefit other forensic framework efforts.
While the proof of concept lacks the persistence and, due to language and
algorithm choices, part of the performance characteristics needed for a pro-
duction system, the base design should be usable for use in a C++ port
that addresses each of these issues. The existing code is stable enough to be
used as foundation during the development of a framework on top of it. this
means that work on MattockFS improvements and work on the framework
could be done in parallel.
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Appendix A
Scripts created for OCFA
timing analysis
[1] strip2.py, Script for extracting timing information from an
OCFA Postgres database dump https://github.com/pibara/
mattock-dissertation/blob/master/ocfa/step1/strip2.py
[2] eventdump.py, Script for extracting first occurrence/last occurrence
event from an OCFA time-info dump https://github.com/pibara/
mattock-dissertation/blob/master/ocfa/step2/eventdump.py
[3] virtcachesize.py Script for generating probability density
graph of fictitious cache size https://github.com/pibara/
mattock-dissertation/blob/master/ocfa/step2/virtcachesize.
py
[4] intervals.py Script for generating wide range of timing inter-
val PD graphs https://github.com/pibara/mattock-dissertation/
blob/master/ocfa/step3/intervals.py
[5] inflow.py Script for generating a set of inflow/outflow PD func-
tion graphs https://github.com/pibara/mattock-dissertation/
blob/master/ocfa/step4/inflow.py
[6] flow2dot.py Script for generating a cross-module data-flow diagram
https://github.com/pibara/mattock-dissertation/blob/master/
ocfa/step5/flow2dot.py
[7] genflow2dot.py Script for generating a consolidated version of
the cross-module data-flow diagram https://github.com/pibara/
mattock-dissertation/blob/master/ocfa/step5/genflow2dot.py
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Appendix B
Page-cache in Linux
In this appendix we examine the core properties of the Linux page-cache
and the possibilities for interacting with the page-cache and related mem-
ory layout parameters in a way that could limit the disk-cache miss rate of a
multi-process system running on this OS. First we will look at the main mem-
ory usage strategy used by Linux and at the way that page-cache competes
for RAM with other RAM consuming Linux subsystems. We will look at
information we can extract from the virtual /proc filesystem and at POSIX
API’s that provide a way to interact with the way the page-cache works. We
then move on to project this knowledge to our fictitious computer-forensic
framework and discuss what measures can be taken to effectively interact
with the Linux system in order to limit page-cache misses on a Linux system
that is hosting such a framework. We close this appendix by reasoning about
possible strategies that could be used by a computer-forensic framework in
an attempt to optimize disk-cache hit percentages while at the same time not
introducing other sources of stagnating throughput to the resulting setup.
B.1 Allocation and use of page-cache
RAM in a computer is a shared resource. It is a scarce resource that is
managed by the operating system. The OS kernel itself runs in RAM as do
the user processes. Both kernel/process code, heap and stack take up pieces
of RAM and on a busy system some RAM pages may end up getting swapped
out of RAM to an on-disk swap facility. Not all RAM is kept available to
kernel and processes. Part of RAM is allocated to hold a copy of on-disk
data and to act as a cache for file data that the Linux kernel assumes is
likely to be read again in the foreseeable future, allowing for more efficient
use of the, relatively slow, reading from hard disk media. An other part
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is allocated to hold data pages that should eventually end up on disk and
aren’t synced to disk yet to improve the overall system performance related
to issues with frequent short writes. The Linux kernel needs to balance the
desire to avoid wasting disk-IO on swapping out process memory with the
desire to not waste disk-IO on data that could have been cached. It’s as
if there is a rubber band between the process oriented RAM usage and the
file-IO oriented RAM usage. As such, memory available to page-cache is not
static. It depends on the behavior of the different processes on the system.
Our main interest in RAM for the purpose of this research is an interest in
the part of the RAM used for the read-part of the page cache. While there
is a lot to say about the use and tuning of write oriented caches, this falls
outside of the scope of this paper and thus shall not be discussed here.
B.2 /proc/meminfo
In the /proc filesystem, the pseudo file /proc/meminfo can be used to ac-
cess kernel information about the size and use of the system RAM. Some
potentially interesting variables that can be retrieved from this pseudo file
are:
• Cached : In-memory cache for files read from disk (the page-cache).
• MemFree : The total of memory that is free to be used for anything.
• Active : Recently used memory that ideally isn’t reclaimed.
• MemTotal : The total usable system RAM.
• SwapTotal : Total amount of swap space available.
• SwapFree : The currently unused portion of the swap space.
The information from this pseudo file can be used to initialize or later tune
our efforts at throttling data input into our system.
B.3 /sys/block/$DEV/stat
Other than directly looking at the memory usage divisions, the actual disk
activity should be a good indication of how well the page-cache is performing
across a long running operation. The system pseudo filesystem defines a
directory under /sys/block for every block device. In any such directory
resides a pseudo file named stat that contains information that should be
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useful in this sense. The pseudo file gives access to I/O statistics of a given
block device. Each line contains the current disk stat variables for a single
device.
1. Number of reads completed.
2. Number of reads merged.
3. Number of sectors read.
4. Number of milliseconds spend reading.
5. Number of writes completed.
6. Number of writes merged.
7. Number of sectors written.
8. Number of milliseconds spent writing.
9. Number of I/Os currently in progress.
10. Number of milliseconds spent doing I/O
11. Weighted number of milliseconds doing I/O
For our research we are interested in the first four numbers. The reading
behavior. If we are to compare strategies for disk-cache efficiency, a test
run with a lower number of reads, a higher number of reads merged and
a smaller number of milliseconds spent reading would be the preferred re-
sult. As disk-cache misses would result in undesirable additional reads and
increased amount of time spent reading, a good page-cache efficient solution
should result in those numbers going down.
B.4 Starting off with a clean slate
If we want to repeatedly run tests on the page-cache behavior of the system,
it will be important that we can reinitialize our page-cache so that a first
test does not mess with a second or third test. So how do we reinitialize the
page cache so we can start our test with a clean slate? There are two things
we need to do. First make sure all page cache can be initialized cleanly by
invoking sync as root. After that we run the following command (as root):
• echo 3 > /proc/sys/vm/drop_caches
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This command will write the number 3 to the pseudo file /proc/sys/vm/-
drop_caches. Doing so will prompt the kernel to free the cache and slab
objects. Finally we should save a copy of both /proc/meminfo and the rel-
evant /sys/block/$DEV/stat files before we can run our test. After running
the test, a second copy can be made of these pseudo files. The differences
between the two should yield information related to the page-cache mis/hit-
rates.
B.5 API interaction with the page-cache part
of the Linux kernel
B.5.1 posix_fadvice
The Posix API call posix_fadvise or posix_fadvice64 advises the kernel about
the expected behavior of the application with respect to a region of data as
associated with an open file descriptor. This advice helps the kernel in its
page-cache behavior, as it will allow the kernel to determine if specific pages
should get precedence over others when deciding what old page-cache data
to keep and what to drop. A few important values for the advice are:
• POSIX_FADV_WILLNEED : The data is expected to be accessed in
the near future
• POSIX_FADV_DONTNEED : The data is NOT expected to be ac-
cessed in the near future
• POSIX_FADV_NOREUSE : The data is expected to only be accessed
once.
B.5.2 mincore
It is possible for the application itself to find out if data it wants to access is
currently present in the page cache. To do this, the application can invoke
the mincore API call.
B.5.3 readahead
If the application knows that a file-descriptor is about to be used to read a
specific range of data, it may populate the page-cache explicitly by invoking
the readahead Linux specific API call.
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B.6 Interaction between a computer-forensic
framework and the Linux kernel
When we assume a CarvFS-like user space file-system and an OCFA-like
routing and relaying architecture will be used, and if we look at the capa-
bilities and knowledge that these and other subsystems may have, we get to
the following list of assertions:
• The CarvFS-like user space file-system, assuming that it keeps a file
descriptor opened to the underlying data archive file, is the only place
where API based interaction with the page-cache kernel subsystem is
effective.
• Knowledge about active CarvPaths within the framework context, is
possibly not directly available to the CarvFS-like user space file-system
and could come from explicit interaction of either the modules involved
or the routing and messaging infrastructure. Alternatively this inter-
action can be avoided by integrating other functionalities into the file-
system component.
• With this knowledge, the CarvFS-like user space file-system can use
invocation of the posix_fadvice API in a more structural way, properly
marking the designated areas according to their projected remaining
cross-module paths and usage.
B.7 Possible strategies
If we assume that a future computer-forensic framework will take the advice
from the main paper at heart and will integrate the routing functionality in
the libraries used by the different modules, we suggest that a strategy for
page-cache interaction would be definable inside of the routing rule defini-
tions. That is, we will want to allow the shared library code to set specific
strategies either on a static module based manner or dynamically dependant
on the specific routing configuration rules triggered by evidence meta data.
While in a routing library based approach the use of readahead may be war-
ranted, within the scope of our research we shall focus on posix_fadvise and
throttling. Given that some modules will look only at the file header. As a
carvpath may be a sub entity of an other bigger entity, the current state of
the parent region should also be relevant to our strategy for the sub entity.
Other than the posix_fadvice policies, we also need to look at throt-
tling. There are two types of throttling that are relevant. Throttling based
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on processing chunks of a large CarvPath entity that isn’t marked with
posix_fadvise in order to remain stored in the page-cache, and throttling
with regards to the entering of fresh data into the growing archive of under-
lying data. Based on the information from /proc/meminfo combined with
the size of the currently mapped-as-active data chunks, throttle levels can be
calculated.
B.8 Conclusions
The use of the posix_fadvise API, especially the use of DONTNEED to
indicate a chunk of content no longer needs to reside in the page-cache,
seems to be a pivotal concept within our project. The communication with
the kernel gives us many hooks to implement a forensic framework in a way
that allows us to reduce the amount of page-cache misses in the system.
As a result of multiple factors the interaction between the framework and
the kernel page-cache mechanism will go through a CarvFS-like user space
file-system and shared library code used by all individual modules within
the framework. Our first proof of concept will be less configurable than
would be possible, yet our projected file-system should implement all the
needed interaction points to allow a future implementation of an advanced
router library to implement more advanced tuning through interaction with
the file-system. The file-system will need to implement a type of CarvPath
state graph that allows it to identify and eliminate data chunks that are
no longer required to stay in the page-cache. It also needs to implement a
way for a library to interact with it and set a policy or update the state for
a specific CarvPath. Implementing throttling as a library poll loop seems
reasonable for our proof of concept. We shall need to define a type of file-
system based API, using either extended attributes or ioctl. As this will
need to be combined with our desire to implement opportunistic hashing,
the definition of this API will be the subject of appendix E.
Appendix C
Secure hashing algorithm
selection
Traditionally digital forensics has always used secure hashes for multiple pur-
poses. With new cryptographic advances in the subfield of secure hashes, the
specific algorithms that are commonly used in digital forensics have come
to be considered cryptographically deprecated. This appendix looks into
these deprecation issues with commonly used algorithms, compatibility is-
sues with moving to other algorithms and performance and scalability con-
siderations with alternative secure hashing functions. It also addresses how
opportunistic-hashing geared algorithms in MattockFS further underline the
need for specific hash function properties.
C.1 Hashing algorithm choice is essential
Traditionally MD5, and later also SHA1 have been used as hashing algo-
rithms in digital forensics. From a cryptographic point of view, MD5 is now
deprecated while SHA1 is in the process of being deprecated. Many pub-
lic and law-enforcement-only hash collections like the Virusshare hash set
or national child pornography hash sets are still distributed only with MD5
and/or SHA1 hashes. Others like the NIST NSRL contain MD5 and SHA1
hashes but are now supplemented with SHA256 hashes. While the last may
sound like good news, there is another important issue with SHA256 for use
in a forensic framework; SHA256 may be significantly more secure as a hash-
ing algorithm compared to SHA1 or MD5, it is also significantly more CPU
intensive and not parallelizable. These properties may undermine the whole
concept of opportunistic hashing as presented in this paper. While today
NIST still considers the use of SHA1 for purposes as defined in this paper as
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acceptable use, we must consider the retroactive impact that a cryptography
expert testifying on behalf of the defense and questioning the use of SHA1
in the forensic process may have a few years from now if SHA1 reaches the
same level of deprecation that MD5 has today. Signs that SHA1s practical
deprecation is near are plentiful. Recently a freestart collision has cast se-
rious doubt on the remaining validity of the NIST acceptable use stand and
has shown that the use of GPUs could be leveraged to significantly reduce
the potential cost of generating a SHA1 collision. It thus can be argued
that moving forward to a non-deprecated secure hashing algorithm should
be considered a priority for digital forensics. Given the CPU resource issues
with SHA256, it is also of paramount significance that the algorithm we move
towards should have at least reasonable resource requirements in its software
implementation. A quick study into available secure hashing algorithms re-
veals a small family of secure hashing algorithms share properties that would
make each of these secure hashing algorithms prime candidates for supple-
menting and eventually replacing SHA1 as primary hashing algorithm for
computer forensics.
C.2 Deprecation
In this section we will look at why MD5 and SHA1 should be considered
cryptographically deprecated and while this has limited impact on the tech-
nological and economic realities of digital forensics, it may pose a serious
problem in the legal arena.
C.2.1 Collision resistance
When looking into the deprecation of SHA1 and MD5, the sole reason for
practical deprecation of these two algorithms stems from attacks that reduce
the collision resistance. Collision resistance comes in multiple forms, but the
base property lies in the difficulty of finding two data entities with the exact
same hash in a situation where both data entities may be manipulated. In
its simplest form such collision would be fixed size relatively small chunks of
data, but in a more complex form collisions may be generated by manipulat-
ing just the last part of larger data entities. Given the use of white-lists with
hashes of files that are part of known software packages, a collision like this
might be used as anti-forensic technique by for example generating a colli-
sion between a modified version of a clip-art image and an image containing
illegal content. If the clip-art can than be made part of some whitelistable
collection, the illegal content shall remain under the radar indefinitely. A sim-
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ilar attack may be possible without poisoning the white-lists. A computer
forensic framework may opt not to process the same entity twice and may
use a secure-hash to stop itself from doing so. If a subject can poison the
already-processed hash collection, than a second file with different content
may be omitted from being processed later on. These attacks are techni-
cally possible with MD5 and could be theoretically achievable with SHA1 in
the not too distant future. From a practical point of view though, the use
of cryptographic containers that support the concept of plausibly deniable
encryption would seem a much more economical way to achieve the same
data hiding goals. There currently are no concrete indications that collision
attacks might be in use as anti-forensic data-hiding technique.
C.2.2 First pre-image resistance
Other than collision resistance, pre-image resistance lies in the difficulty of
finding a data entity that, when hashed, yields a given hash. If a hash func-
tion is collision resistance, than it should be pre-image resistant as well. An
economical pre-image attack could allow simpler anti-forensic data-hiding.
Collisions could be created with any hash from the commonly used white
lists in order to hide data. Alternatively a denial of service against known
bad could be possible. Imagine a large set of photo’s and other images being
modified to match hashes from a child pornography related database. A first
pre-image attack against a hashing function would have a significant impact
on the use in forensic frameworks. One possibly even worse problem with a
first pre-image attack possibility would be the the legal ramifications of the
possibilities of investigators to inject fabricated evidence into a disk image
while maintaining the validity of the recorded hash. Digital forensic good-
practice dictates that a secure hash is generated and recorded out-of-band
when a disk image is created. This practice ensures that lab-investigators
can’t accidentally or out of malice change the content of the disk image. A
pre-image attack could allow an investigator to inject false evidence into a
disk image file without changing the validity of the secure hash that was
generated during acquisition.
C.2.3 First pre-image resistance and hash sets
Combined hash-sets used in digital forensics can grow relatively big. As a
result an anti-forensic pre-image attack could become somewhat more viable
resulting from the fact that a typical hash collection for combined black and
white listing will typically have 226..228 hashes. This fact makes it feasible
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that a first pre-image attack that isn’t practically feasible against a single
target hash, may be feasible when implemented as 228 parallel attacks.
C.2.4 Use in forensic frameworks
Given that SHA1 and MD5 due to their diminished collision resistance should
be considered deprecated from a collision resistance point of view does not
imply that from a technical point of view they are now unusable for all com-
puter forensic purposes. The combination of diminished collision resistance
with the properties of the hash set sizes used in the forensic process should
however be sufficient to cast doubt on the use of these deprecated algorithms
in a forensic framework. While today anti-forensic attacks may be unseen and
impractical, the continued use of these algorithms in combination with size-
able list of process-flow-influencing hash lists seems a fundamentally flawed
approach waiting for a serious attack factor to happen.
C.2.5 Use for guarding the forensic process
While there seems no technical ground yet for discontinuing the use of first
pre-image resistant hashes for guarding the forensic process as done by the
out-of-band recording of hashes at acquisition time, we must remember that a
judge is bound to lack the deep level of technical insight needed to distinguish
between collision resistance related deprecation of a hash, possible large-
collection first-pre-image related issues, and first-pre-image related issues.
Given this reality, it would be quite easy for a judge to get confused between
the responsible use of for example SHA1 for safeguarding the integrity of a
full disk image (a use that should only suffer when first pre-image resistance
is significantly reduced), the use where a 228 entry large set of hashes would
make a less significantly reduced first pre-image resistance a serious problem
and the use where even the reduced collision resistance could pose a problem.
Given this likely confusion, it should be considered a real possibility that
a judge, using a cryptographic expert to gain some understanding of the
weaknesses of a hashing algorithm might for example dismiss digital forensic
findings based on the fact that the digital forensic investigators knowingly
used deprecated hashing algorithms and compromised the essential integrity
of the forensic process by not using any of the available modern secure hashes.
One additional problem with a judge coming to such a conclusion is that legal
rulings can have ramifications that stretch well beyond the confines of just the
specific legal case. While on technical and economical grounds the continued
use of cryptographically broken hashes may be defensible, from a legal risk
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perspective for the prosecution, moving forward seems even more urgent as
it does from a technical perspective.
C.2.6 MD5
MD5 is a secure hashing algorithm that has been in wide use in digital foren-
sics and is still used as sole hashing algorithm for for example the Virusshare
hash set. In 2004 Xiaoyun Wang and Hongbo Yu found that MD5 is not
collision resistant. Today MD5 collisions are not just possible but practical
to the extent that using commodity hardware, generating multiple collisions
per second has become a reality. In 2009 Yu Sasaki, Kazumaro Aoki found
a pre-image attack against MD5 with a complexity of 2123.4. It is generally
accepted that MD5 is deprecated as a secure hashing algorithm and should
not be used, even though the pre-image attack may not be of practically
usable complexity.
C.2.7 SHA1
When MD5 started showing major problems, digital forensics started to
largely move towards the use of SHA1. The performance of SHA1 does not
deviate significantly from that of MD5. Today, in 2015 Stevens, Karpman
& Peyrin demonstrated a freestart collision using ten days and a 64 GPU
cluster. In cryptographic circles SHA-1 is widely considered as deprecated
and Stevens, Karpman & Peyrin’s work on freestart collisions supports this
position. At the moment of writing NIST still addresses the use of SHA1
for the computer forensic purposes of known-good/known-bad matching as
acceptable use. These statements however predate the freestart collision.
Accelerated deprecation of SHA1 in the wake of this freestart collision would
be in line with expectations.
C.3 Alternatives
While there is sufficient reason to avoid the use of MD5, and plan for the
eminent wider deprecation of SHA-1, the path forward is not directly evident.
NIST includes SHA256 hashes in their hash sets, yet SHA256 may not be
the most suitable for use with digital forensic processes. We look at different
alternative hashes.
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C.3.1 SHA256
SHA256 is one of the hash functions from the SHA2 family. While NIST
has added SHA256 to its NSRL hash lists, there are reasons why SHA256
may not be the most logical step forward for extensive use in a forensic
framework. With NIST’s choice for SHA256 and the lack of concrete plans
for adding other hashes to their datasets, SHA256 could be a good choice
from a compatibility point of view. Performance and system resource usage,
when compared to MD5 and SHA1 however, raises serious questions about
its usability. While in the past hashing overhead may have been negligible
due to IO overhead and throughput speeds, in modern system setups, using
SSD, IO latency and throughput have changed the balance. In situations
where multi-layered opportunistic hashing is used, even when using non-SSD
technology, the practice of opportunistic hashing and page-cache efficiency
enhancing techniques shifts the IO versus hashing operation ratios away from
IO towards hashing operations. Considering these two realities, picking a
hashing algorithm that triples hashing overhead, today has become more of
an obstacle than it would have been in the past.
C.3.2 SKEIN, BLAKE & BLAKE2
While SHA2 was meant to succeed SHA1, SHA2 itself has now been suc-
ceeded by SHA3. The SHA3 standard was the result of a competition by
NIST to find a successor for SHA2, as it was feared that SHA2 might soon
proof to be broken in a way similar to SHA1. Where SHA3 aimed to provide
a general purpose hashing function, the needs for digital forensics are more
specifically geared toward software implementations and variable length data.
If we look at the SHA3 candidates and focus purely on the selection criteria
that would make these candidates suitable for digital forensics, then the final
winner (Keccak) would not have been the first candidate for a secure hash
replacement for SHA1 in the field of digital forensics. There were however
two SHA3 candidates, SKEIN and BLAKE that showed software implemen-
tation properties that make these algorithms more likely candidates for an
acceptable SHA1 replacement. Further, there has been some development
on an algorithm that must be seen as part of the same family as SKEIN
and BLAKE. BLAKE2 is a continuation of the BLAKE efforts that is sig-
nificantly faster than SHA1 on the modern server architectures that will be
typical in computer forensic investigations.
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C.4 Choice of algorithm
If we discard the interesting and important efforts in the fields of partial,
Merkle-tree based and fuzzy hashing, and focus on full-entity hashing, there
are four main ways how hashes are used in computer forensic processing.
• Check against known good. This includes abandoning further process-
ing for for example Windows OS system files.
• Check against known bad. This includes marking for example known
child pornography image files.
• Check against seen before. This can keep a forensic framework from
for example unzipping a large archive that is found in many places for
every place where it was found.
• Applying set-theory to groups of files from different sources within a
single investigation. This includes things like allowing an investigator
to select all office documents unique to the intersection of office files
found on the systems of two suspects.
For the first two purposes, compatibility of the hashing algorithms used in
the known file hashes data set with the hashing algorithm used by the frame-
work is important. For the other two purposes there exists only one algorithm
to be compatible with; the one chosen to be used by the framework. It is
with the first two types of usage that we run into an issue with choosing a
hashing algorithm for MattockFS. The problem is that data-set producers
seem to be behind the curve with regards to secure hashing. Many known-file
data-set providers only provide SHA1 hashes. According to NIST, SHA1 is
deprecated for the generation of secure hashes (as was MD5 before it). Even
NIST though still distributes their NSRL known-file hash data-set with (next
to SHA256 hashes) SHA1 hashes. As use of hashes in computer forensics in-
volves the hashing of large amounts of data, and as access speeds to that data
are increasing as the use of solid state disks in small scale computer forensics
setups gains more traction, the poor performance of the more secure SHA256
becomes a serious performance consideration. There are several alternative
hashing algorithms that combine a strong and secure hash with a decent or
good performance on a software platform. Most notably two (non-winning)
candidates for SHA-3: SKEIN and BLAKE. Those however come with a lack
of compatibility with our dataset providers. Finally, a successor to BLAKE,
BLAKE2bp comes in forms optimized to take advantage of 64 bit multi core
systems. A short comparison against SHA1 : When we look at the numbers
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Algorithm Secure Compatible Speed
SHA1 NO YES 100%
SHA256 YES YES 30%
SKEIN YES NO 75%
BLAKE2b YES NO 135%
BLAKE2bp YES NO 420%
SHA1+BLAKE2bp YES YES 80%
above, we can conclude that combining SHA1 with the multi-core 64 bit op-
timized BLAKE2bp algorithm will give us at least the security of SHA256
combined with the compatibility of SHA1 at a performance hit of only 20%
when compared to only using SHA1. Given the current compatibility needs
and the expectation that fast solid-state storage will continue to shift the
balance between IO and hashing performance, we propose that digital foren-
sics as a field consider the following migration path away from the usage of
SHA1.
• legacy : SHA1 only (100% speed; compatible/insecure)
• transitional Dual SHA1/BLAKE2bp hashing (80% speed; compati-
ble/secure)
• performance BLAKE2bp only (420% speed; incompatible/secure)
For the use with opportunistic hashing, the performance aspect is signifi-
cantly more dominant given that a single read may result in a multitude of
hashing progress operations, the more performant BLAKE2bp justifies the
choice to not provide for a migrational path in MattockFS.
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C.5 Conclusion
As recent development regarding traditionally used secure hashing algorithms
seem to accelerate, the need for their deprecation, the reality that lack of un-
derstanding of the impact of this deprecation may have in a court of law
further underlines the urgency for finding a migration path away from MD5
and SHA1. The multi-core variant of the BLAKE2 algorithm appears to
allow for a migration path that at first includes the sustained use of SHA1
during a short transitional period while allowing for hash-set providers to
catch up. The migrational path also allows the digital forensic process to
become prepared for a time when the balance between IO and hashing per-
formance shifts more towards hashing being the primary bottleneck. We
shall, due to opportunistic hashing specific performance concerns not be us-
ing this migration path in our implementation of the MattockFS. Instead
MattockFS is built using BLAKE2 only. The findings in this appendix also
justify us advocating the application of a migration path to the whole field
of digital forensics.
Appendix D
A Full Framework: An outline
This appendix tries to show the rough outlines of a possible future com-
puter forensics framework that would built on the good parts and lessons
learned from the Open Computer Forensics Architecture (OCFA), current
day technological advancements, modern insights from the field of computer
forensics and high-volume data processing, access control technologies and
the concepts and sub-system introduced in the MattockFS dissertation that
this document was written as an appendix for. The idea of this appendix
is to draw a rough outline of a possible, partially OCFA inspired framework
using modern day information technology components and insights gained
from years of OCFA usage and the analysis done on OCFA timing that was
described in Appendix-A. A framework that, if completed, could fill the gap
that in an academic sense was left by the discontinuation of OCFA devel-
opment by the Dutch police. While this gap has been filled successfully for
Dutch law enforcement by the Xiraf framework developed by the Netherlands
Forensic Institute, and while on a smaller scale the framework provided by
PyFlag and possibly the Sleuthkit Hadoop Framework have taken interesting
steps, PyFlag, has not moved significantly beyond any of the same legacy im-
plementation choices that OCFA made. The Sleuthkit Hadoop Framework
efforts on the other hand, like OCFA seem to have been abandoned. Neither
architectures have addressed the basics of disk-cache efficiency as addressed
in this paper. As far as a literature study has revealed, no open source
frameworks that exists today has managed to provide the academic com-
munity with a framework suitable for both small scale experiments and for
experiments that work with a more sizeable lifelike data corpus and server
cluster setup. Computer forensic research projects of the scale of for exam-
ple the FIVES project that used OCFA at its core would hardly be possible
today. This while OCFA in itself was actually never designed with an aca-
demic setting in mind. The framework described in this appendix aims to
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first and foremost address the needs of computer forensic academic research,
while keeping use as an alternate tool in cybercrime and other real world
computer forensics investigations a serious option. While implementation of
a full open source academic forensic framework with the required properties
falls far outside of the scope of a single M.Sc research project, this appendix
will provide a rough architectural outline of such a framework and will ex-
plain how MattockFS could play a pivotal role in the realization of such a
framework. We shall address the base architectural design proposed in this
appendix as The Mattock Computer Forensic Framework. The idea of the
naming stems from the naming of the carving tool scalpel, metaphorically
referring to the scalpel used in forensic pathology. The idea is that while a
tool the size of and with the precision of a scalpel is indispensable at any
scale, if you want to scale up your investigations to the scale of a rogue burial
site, you will also need bigger tools like a mattock for excavating the bodies
first. Its just a working title for the prospect architecture. Anyone picking
up on this paper is invited to come up with a more suitable name for the
resulting framework.
D.1 The OCFA architecture
When we look at the OCFA architecture, at its core we can clearly identify
a fully custom build asynchronous messaging framework for processing mod-
ules that communicate with a small set of networking components that act to
combine the modules into dynamic chains of tools that are applied to parts
of the forensic evidence data. The use of commodity software components is
mostly limited to the pervasive use of XML technology and a central rela-
tional database. We shall now have a look at some of the core components
of the OCFA framework.
D.1.1 The AnyCast Relay and PPQ
At its basis, OCFA was a message passing concurrency based system. One
known issue with message passing concurrency is the use of buffers. While
message passing environment like the Erlang programming language and
platform opt to put producing processes to sleep when buffers fill up, OCFA
opted for a different approach. In OCFA, the message passing buffers were
managed by on-disk persistent priority queues. These queues only contained
references to in database large text objects. The persistent queues were
meant and designed to be fully crash resistant. The priority queues had a
special ’never’ priority to hold messages that were observed to crash specific
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Figure D.1: The base OCFA architecture
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modules. This allowed modules to be restarted and to skip problematic data
until a maintenance programmer would look at the problematic data and
buggy module to fix the problem and re-submit the messages in the never
queue for further processing. The AnyCast relay was built on top of the
persistent priority queue. Every module connected to the AnyCast relay and
registered as a consumer of a certain type (a module instance) and would
go into a message processing event loop asking the AnyCast relay for new
jobs. When a module was done with a piece of evidence data, or when a
module derived a sub entity from such data (for example an attachment as
child entity of an e-mail message), the module would send a message to the
AnyCast Relay addressed at a special process named the router. The Any-
Cast would keep track of irresponsive and broken network connections and
would play an important role in having stale or crashed modules restarted
in a way not unlike what is common practice in Erlang based architectures.
On such a detected crash, messages that were still pending a response would
be put aside in the never queue to be looked at by a technician at a later
point in time. In OCFA the AnyCast relay served as a single server for all
modules, independent of the server these modules would run on.
D.1.2 OcfaLib, a domain specific asynchronous frame-
work
While today NodeJS has mainstreamed the purpose of a generic asynchronous
framework, and while in other programming languages generic asynchronous
frameworks such as Twisted for Python or Boost::asio for C++ have been
available for quite a while, OCFA was first built long before such systems
became mainstream. As a result, OCFA basically ended up building its own
asynchronous processing framework. We could say that OcfaLib, the C++
OCFA library was a domain specific asynchronous framework for use with
the AnyCast server.
D.1.3 The legacy Module API
OCFA came with two quite distinct module Application Programming In-
terfaces (APIs). This fact was the result of chronology of development. The
first version of OCFA came with a module API not much unlike that of the
current day Sleuthkit framework. A module would get a file to process and
could add meta data to that file, or, when it wanted to for example mark
an extracted e-mail attachment as child entity, would submit that informa-
tion to the framework. The API consisted of a module initialization part
and a single method called ’processEvidence’ that a module was supposed to
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overload. From within processEvidence the module could either add meta or
submit a child entity with added meta date.
D.1.4 The Tree-graph API
After new modules got added to OCFA, the legacy module API was found to
be lacking in the meta-data area. The problem was that a module deriving a
tree of children would not be able to set meta-data for deeper child entities.
Only level zero and level one meta data was possible. As a result, the more
powerful tree-graph API was added. As porting old modules to the new API
was considered a waste of precious development time, the old API was also
still continued after the introduction of the new API.
D.1.5 The legacy CAS storage
OCFA in its initial release came with a Content Addressed Storage system
for storing data entities. Data was created or, lacking CarvPath facilities,
first copied to a temporary file and hashed during copy. Once the hash was
fully calculated, the temporary file was either moved to a location derived
directly from the hash of its content, or discarded if an entity with the same
hash was already present in the repository.
D.1.6 CarvFS
Later releases of OCFA were made compatible with the use of CarvFS for
parts of the storage needs. CarvFS integration has however remained a
bit of a hack. The storage sub-system of OCFA used physical symbolic
links to CarvFS CarvPaths inside of its primarily CAS based storage system.
This meant that for example when using a CarvPath aware Sleuthkit MMLS
module, storage of a partition in the OCFA CAS storage system required the
full partition to be read for hashing purposes before it could be symlinked in
the storage subsystem.
D.1.7 The meta-data based message router
At the core of the OCFA architecture was the central meta-data based router.
This XML technology based router would parse the meta-data that modules
had gathered regarding a data entity, and would based on an, also XML-
based, rule-list determine the next hop in the tool-chain for that data entity.
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Figure D.2: The base PyFlag architecture
D.1.8 The use of an SQL server
There were two technologies that were pervasively used within OCFA. One is
the XML we already discussed. The second one was a relational database. It
was used by the storage subsystem, by the messaging subsystem, and thirdly
by the meta-data storing data-store-module. In each of these uses, the use
of an SQL database turned out to be a sub-optimal choice for a number of
reasons. Some related to the creation of run-time performance bottlenecks
and others related to the nature of the data structure and the nature of
useful analysis-time queries on this data. More on this when we discuss the
alternatives for Mattock.
D.2 PyFlag
Next to OCFA, the PyFlag framework deserves mention in this paper. While
PyFlag has quite a different scope than OCFA it shares a lot of similarities
too. Where OCFA is meant purely as a framework for computer forensics,
PyFlag is a hybrid system that also addresses the field of network forensics.
This hybrid approach makes that this framework would in a fundamental
way be much more difficult to apply disk-cache related optimizations to. It
thus would be unfair to look at PyFlag purely from a large scale computer
forensic data processing point of view in a comparative way.
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D.3 The Sleuthkit Hadoop framework
A more promising development was the Sleuthkit Hadoop framework. It
aimed to combine The Sleuthkit with specific distributed technologies. The
technology proposed was a combination of the HDFS distributed file-system
and the distributed NoSQL database HBASE, both part of the Hadoop tech-
nology stack. That is, a distributed file-system and NoSQL technology. We
shall look in more detail at suitable NoSQL technology. While HBASE isn’t
a bad choice at the processing end, there are data structure and analysis con-
cerns that would point to different NoSQL technology as potentially more
suitable. Further, the initial import performance of redundant distributed
storage might make looking closely at the performance/redundancy aspects
for any distributed storage system a crucial selection step. Today the concept
of erasure encoding based distributed storage might provide an interesting
middle ground between the two. Yet, taking a more NUMA or striping
approach to scaling the storage for distributed computer forensic data pro-
cessing might also proof an interesting alternative.
D.4 Non-open frameworks
It is important to note that due to the closed (non open-source) nature of the
frameworks involved, this paper does not look into some major and widely
successful non-open forensic frameworks such as Xiraf or FTK Distributed
Install. The scope of this appendix is limited to open tools and publications.
D.5 Digital Evidence Bags
So far we have been looking purely at scalability and performance of foren-
sic architectures without considering other important new computer forensic
insights. One conceptual idea that all current frameworks seem to discard
are the key concept introduced with so called Sealed Digital Evidence Bags
(S-DABs) by Bradley Schatz and Andrew Clark in 2006. While the details
of S-DEBs fall outside of the scope of this appendix, one key aspect deserves
special attention: The concept that both data and meta-data require a form
of tamper-proofness. That is, once a piece of evidence data or meta-data is
entered into the system, this (meta-)data should be considered to be logi-
cally immutable. We shall take this concept with us in our outlines for a
next generation scalable framework.
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D.6 New insights
Looking at OCFA and other vintage forensic frameworks, there are in ret-
rospect important suboptimal choices that would be made differently if a
framework like that was to be developed today. In this section we summa-
rize a few important insights that arose from many years of using OCFA, a
survey of other open frameworks, a literature survey and the results of the
timing analysis in the main paper.
• A tree-graph API is essential : While simpler API’s can be useful for
some trivial modules, all such modules could also work with a more
generic tree graph API. Having just one generic tree-graph oriented
API could facilitate a much wider range of modules and if the API is
defined in asynchronous terms, the API could be portable to alternative
architectures.
• Leveraging asynchronous frameworks is promising : OCFA implemented
its own custom asynchronous framework and the part of the OCFA
code-base involved with implementing that functionality was substan-
tial. With current day asynchronous frameworks such as Twisted,
Boost::asio or NodeJS, the need for a custom built asynchronous frame-
work has disappeared.
• Evidence sealing, privilege separation and access control facilities are
a must : It is essential to limit the mutability time-span and scope to
an absolute minimum. Both from an anti-forensics point of view, and
from the point of view of the legal credibility of the integrity of the
implemented forensic process.
• Reducing disk-cache misses and other spurious reads is essential for
performance: While many papers focus on CPU cycles being wasted
by inefficient forensic processes, the truth is that much of the forensic
process is IO rather than CPU constrained. As such, the fact that the
same data will get read multiple times should make clear that a disk-
cache miss will impact throughput and that a forensic framework such
as OCFA with a design that does not effectively mitigate disk-cache
miss rates will suffer from disk-cache-miss related IO bottlenecks.
• Zero-storage carving is essential : The process of locating, carving and
validating files on disk images is complex and will either result in high
false positive or high false negative counts. In the case of high false-
positives, copy-out will result in unreasonable requirements for forensic
archive storage of derived entities. In the case of high false negatives
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essential data may be missed. Applying zero-storage carving facilities
such as CarvFS will allow for a relatively low cost of false positives while
minimizing the amount of additional storage required for processing.
• Simple priorities don’t really work : While our research has shown that
priority queuing as used in OCFA would be effective for homogeneously
sized chunks of evidence data, not taking into account the size of the
evidence entities and their likely disk-cache status in prioritizing has
been shown to yield such poor results that the usefulness of priority
queuing in such a way must be seriously questioned.
• Most current day forensic disk image formats are poorly suited for large-
scale processing archives : In large scale investigations encompassing
hundreds of full-size disk images, the in-lab usage of the common com-
puter forensic disk image storage formats (EFF & AFF) have shown
to be rather poorly suited due mostly to scalability issues of keeping
hundreds of opened disk-image state-object open. Lacking a forensic-
lab storage format for large archives of disk images, the use of simple
sparse dd images currently seems to be better suited in a scalable lab
environment than the direct usage of these formats. It would be good
if future research would investigate the possibilities of archive friendly
low system-footprint storage of a multitude of computer forensic data.
• Data migration should not be taken lightly : While distributed file-
systems or storage systems such as SNFS can facilitate in making ev-
idence data available on many nodes, it is important to realize that
accessing data from a different node will by definition result in a disk-
cache miss on that node. It is suggested that data migration should
prefer either the early migration of data that has not yet been fully
cached by the originating module, or the migration of relatively small
chunks of data targeted for relatively high-CPU processing on the other
node.
• Relational (SQL) databases are a poor fit on most fronts : In OCFA
the Postgress SQL database was used for many things. In retrospect,
certainly given the current technological landscape, these things would
today all have better alternatives. First of all, the database usage
for mutable meta-data and for the storage and messaging subsystem
together was a major performance bottleneck. Apart from the fact
that in retrospect in-process mutable meta-data does not fit in with
the S-DEB view of things, a relational database is a poor choice of
technology for implementing either such meta-data document storage
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or the extra indirections implemented within the storage and messaging
subsystems. More than that though, the usage of an SQL database by
the data storage module and the user interface have shown that many
of the more advanced analysis’s have had such shape and form that the
database and queries would have been much better of having a more
graph oriented infrastructure. If we look at OCFA and than look at
modern NoSQL technology, we see that parts of the SQL functionality
could better haver been implemented without a database, some could
have been implemented with a distributed key/value store database,
some with a document database and some with a graph database. One
thing all aspects of OCFA have in common is that SQL technology in
todays technology landscape would be a sub-optimal choice.
• Kick-starting may not start at a server node : In OCFA kick-starting
took place from a server node. Before this could be done however, the
EWF files had to be placed on an SNFS partition accessible to the
server from a client through an SNFS connected file-server. Combine
this with the need for converting EWF to dd or an other lab friendly
format, the lack of a client-based EWF submitter led to massive disk
write inefficiency. A kick-starting network client could be an essential
component in a modern forensic framework.
• Not all modules are alike : Todays open source computer forensic frame-
works treat modules as equal citizens. The reality however is that some
modules such as a file-type module are so common in data processing
that framework embedding would be justified, some modules such as
simple carvers are used mostly on huge data files and are IO intensive
while others like OCR work on relatively small data chunks and take up
significant CPU resources. Treating all modules and all data as similar
will inevitably lead to poor overall framework performance.
• Globally valid designations are the key : As each server in a forensic
data processing cluster has its own page-cache, the concept of dividing
the load between different nodes by distributing and redistributing to
different nodes should be positively influenceable by allowing nodes to
have a common communicable notion of the portions of the global in-
vestigation data they and other nodes likely still have in their cache.
For this, a globally valid annotation for data chunks is essential. Carv-
Path annotations could play a major role in this.
• Meta-data serialization technology matters : At the time that OCFA
was devised, XML was the only logical choice for meta-data serializa-
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tion. The XML technology stack though is far from being the most effi-
cient serialization form for forensic meta data. While there are multiple
papers proposing standardized XML formats for forensic meta-data ex-
change, the inefficiency and resource requirements of XML processing
forms a major bottleneck in event-rich high throughput processing envi-
ronments such as within a computer forensic framework. More efficient
serialization options such as JSON, Protocol Buffers or Cap’n Proto
should be seriously considered as alternative to XML.
• Hashing algorithm choice is essential : Traditionally MD5 and later
also SHA1 have been used as hashing algorithms in digital forensics.
From a cryptographic point of view, MD5 is now deprecated while
SHA1 is in the process of soon becoming deprecated. Many pub-
lic and law-enforcement-only hash collections such as for example the
Virusshare hash set or national child pornography hash sets are still
distributed only with MD5 and/or SHA1 hashes. Others like the NIST
NSRL are now supplemented with SHA256 hashes. While the later may
sound like good news, there is an other important issue with SHA256 for
use in a forensic framework: SHA256 may be significantly more secure
as a hashing algorithm than SHA1 or MD5, it is also significantly more
CPU intensive. So much so that it may undermine the whole concept
of opportunistic hashing as presented in this paper. A quick study into
available secure hashing algorithms reveals a small family of secure
hashing algorithms. SKEIN, BLAKE and BLAKE2 share properties
that would make each of these secure hashing algorithms prime can-
didates for supplementing and eventually replacing SHA1 as primary
hashing algorithm for computer forensics. In the previous appendix we
made the case for one of these. The important insight here however
is the notion that while SHA1 is close to deprecation, SHA256 puts
to much strains on resources in a high performance computer forensics
setup and we need to pick a more suitable replacement.
D.7 A modernized OCFA inspired open-source
architecture
With the good parts from the old OCFA architecture combined with the new
insights above, we can sketch the base outlines of a next generation message
passing concurrency open computer forensic framework. It is important to
note that this section is not a comprehensive architectural design document
for a complete framework. It is just a preliminary outline of a possible base
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setup for such an architecture, primarily focussed on describing the position
of MattockFS within such a framework. Let us start out with a rough de-
scription of the changes from the OCFA architecture to our new architecture
outline. The most obvious change can be seen in the dependencies. We
no longer have a central SQL server as dependency. We see that the cus-
tom asynchronous framework gets replaced with a standard asynchronous
framework. This could be boost::asio for C++ or for example twisted for
the Python language. We see that file-type logic and meta-data router are
no longer a separate module and network service but are now integrated in
the base functionality for each module process. As in OCFA, a module in-
stance runs in its own process as part of the asynchronous framework that
it runs under. One module instance per async-framework process and pos-
sibly more module instances per module type if the server architecture and
module type warrant multiple instances of the same module to be run on
the same machine. These would typically be CPU intensive modules on a
server with a high amount of cores. We see that the number of module
APIs is reduced to only the tree-graph API. The most notable change how-
ever is the fact that there is no longer a direct dependency between generic
modules and database technology. The SQL server has disappeared and has
been replaced by other technology. The Data Store Module (DSM) maps
the meta-data into some NoSQL database. This will most likely be a dis-
tributed graph-database or a distributed document-database (or possibly a
hybrid combination of the two such as ArangoDb). Both data and meta-data
are stored in a write-once way within MattockFS, that implements a subset
of the S-DEB concept by means of privilege separation, immutability and
trusted provenance logging. The long-path SQL database as used in CarvFS
is replaced with a distributed key/value NoSQL database. While MattockFS
could initially still run on something like SNFS or an NFS mesh-up, the use
of a distributed file-system might be a potential way forward. The AnyCast
Relay functionality has mostly moved to a system bus like facility provided by
the MattockFS filesystem, combined with a monitoring and load balancing
mesh-up that connects the AnyCast functionality of all Mattock server nodes
and will migrate jobs to other nodes when and only when the CPU needs for
a job are expected to outweigh the cost of the page-cache miss on the peer
node. The kick-starting process is revised. EWF processing is moved to the
client side of things. The client connects to a central kick balancer that will
query all load balancers to find the most appropriate kick server to redirect
the client to.
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Figure D.3: The base Mattock architecture
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D.7.1 The distributed long-path store
The use of CarvPath annotations works very well for most data entities
originating from digital media. In some cases however, such as for log files on
busy servers or large files downloaded in parallel over slow P2P connections,
the files can be so fragmented that the CarvPath ends up being longer than
what would be usable as a file or directory name in a file-system. To overcome
that problem, long CarvPath annotations are replaced with a secure hash of
the actual CarvPath. A storage tokens should be the same on each server
node, knowledge to resolve these short notations back to their full CarvPath
needs to be distributed. Given that the data stored are just simple key/value
pairs, we asses that a NoSQL key/value store database technology could
be most suitable to fill this task. A solution like Redis could be a viable
implementation, but consideration regarding the speed versus persistence
trade-off, and system integrity concerns are important.
D.7.2 MattockFS
MattockFS is discussed in full detail in the main paper. It is a user-space
file-system that is centered around CarvPath annotations and entities that
consist of fragments and/or sparse regions. The file-system provides the dif-
ferent async-modules with a file-system based API to storage and messaging.
Apart from the CarvPath based data access, the MattockFS file-system based
API provides:
• Immutability: The file-system provides facilities to create entities that
are mutable only on creation.
• CarvPath based batches that aim to provide for opportunistic hashes.
A CarvPath can be marked as part of an active tool-chain traversal or
batch, and as it (and possibly its ancestors or descendants) is handled
by multiple modules before the batch is decommissioned, a hash may
be calculated opportunistically.
• Batch based fadvice: as batches get created and decommissioned, Mat-
tockFS can communicate with the kernel about chunks of repository
data being potentially needed or will never get read again. The ker-
nel should be able to use this data to become smarter with respect
to page-cache usage, thus reducing the potential for page-cache miss
performance issues.
• Throttling: As the file-system keeps track of all active tool-chains and
notifies the kernel about data chunks no longer needed in the page-
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cache, MattockFS can provide statistics to async-modules that act as
throttling advice for these modules. It provides total batches-size in-
formation and provides a what-if facility allowing a module to query
how much a new CarvPath would grow the active batches volume. An
async-module should use this info to temporarily restrain from entering
new (derived) data or uncached CarvPaths into the system until the
point when the total amount of active tool-chain space has gone down.
• AnyCast inter-process data exchange: Using extended attributes, sym-
links and special directories, the file-system provides the possibility to
mark data with a next marker, placing it in an AnyCast like queue. It
also allows to accept data for processing as a module.
• Sparse capabilities: For processing a job and for one-time mutable
access to a newly created data entity, the file-system provides sparse
capabilities. These are basically temporary passwords, granting access
to small chunks of authority. Passwords that can however be commu-
nicated between processes so that tool invocations by modules remains
a possibility.
• Total potential page-cache pressure: Provides the load balancer with
info needed to potentially migrate jobs to other nodes.
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D.7.3 The load-balance mesh-up
Migrating a batch to an other node is expensive. Any opportunistic hash-
ing will need to start from nothing, data won’t exist in page cache on the
other node, and unless the storage was highly redundant, there is the extra
networking overhead of making the data available at all on the other node.
For CPU intensive modules however, migrating a job might be well worth
the cost. A load balancer process tries to keep track of things. The amount
of page-cache potentially used up by active batches, the overall system load,
the CPU and RAM usage of different worker modules, etc. This info is then
all shared with load balancers on other server nodes. If a large imbalance is
detected between node’s, a load balancer may act as one or more modules,
accept jobs and close their corresponding batches on the originating server
node. These jobs are than recreated by a load balancer on a different node
where they should live to complete the rest of the tool-chain.
D.7.4 Client/Server kick-starting
With processing being done on a server or a cluster of load-balance connected
nodes, and with forensic disk images normally coming in on external media,
entering the evidence data into the lab-cluster is of main concern. Avoid-
ing spurious image copying and performing load-balancing at this point will
seriously reduce the total processing time on a distributed processing envi-
ronment. To avoid spurious disk image copying, we define a per MattockFS-
file-system instance network kick-start-server that accept data from a client
side forensic disk image processing client. This means the whole of the image
data will only be copied once, directly into a MattockFS repository. In order
to avoid spurious load-balancing actions being needed, getting the client to
send its disk image data to one of the the least loaded of the processing clus-
ter is important. To allow this to happen, a per-cluster kick-start balancing
server is defined. When a kick-start server starts up, it registers with the
kick-start balancing server. The kick-start balancing server is part of the
AnyCast balancing mesh-up network and is kept informed on system and
page-cache load for each of the nodes. When a client wants to upload an
image, it communicates this with the kick-start balancing server and is sent
the network address and port of the kick-start server where it is expected to
deliver its data. With such a construct, kick-starting will be relatively evenly
spread amongst the server nodes.
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D.7.5 Module framework embedded lib-magic function-
ality
In OCFA the libmagic file-type testing functionality was placed in a regular
module. As we identified in the main paper, this module would in most
cases where the mime-type of the data was unknown be invoked as first and
often last module for a batch. We identify that libmagic functionality is
so common that it is warranted to make libmagic functionality part of the
module framework.
D.7.6 Distributed state-full routing logic
In OCFA, the router module tended to be a processing bottleneck. For
OCFA, lacking proper throttling facilities, this bottleneck turned out to ac-
tually mitigate the effects of the lack of throttling, but in a new architecture
with solid throttling support, such bottleneck is undesirable. We pose that
routing functionality can easily be distributed amongst the modules and be
made an intrinsic part of the module framework. The FIVES project pro-
duced an alternate OCFA router that, other than the OCFA router was
state-full in its rule-list processing. The use of such statefullness, combined
with the availability of module generated meta-data, makes that the amount
of meta-data exchanged between individual modules, in most cases can be
limited to just three values:
• A router state string, allowing router logic inside of one module to
continue the rule list where the previous module left of.
• The data mime-type, allowing a module that is able to process multiple
mime-types to distinguish between its types of input.
• The CarvPath of the (meta-)data.
This choice makes it easy to quickly forward any other module generated
meta-data blob to a default data-store module (DSM). So other than in
OCFA where a mutable meta-data trace file was forwarded between all mod-
ules in a batch, in the Mattock architecture the per-module meta-data is
stored as a derived-data MattockFS blob (with mime-type x-mattock/ENC;
where ENC could be any serialization format identification) that is then made
immutable and is immediately forwarded to the DSM.
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D.7.7 From SQL to graph/document based NoSQL
We have already eliminated the use of SQL-server dependencies from most of
the architecture. The module framework only has MattockFS as dependency.
MattockFS uses an in-memory distributed key/value store NoSQL database
for a small part of its annotations. The data storage module however needs
some place to store all meta-data in such a way that it becomes suitable both
for use in a front-end system by investigators and for advanced querying by
investigative-analyst/digital-investigator duos. Experience with such duos
and the use of OCFA databases has shown that most advanced queries tend
to be exactly those queries that would translate to much more efficient and
easy queries if the data had been modeled into a graph of vertexes and edges.
Next to that, OCFA used XML blobs combined with specific indexed fields
for much of its basic front-end related data storage. A task much more
suitable for document databases. We suggest that taking these two distinct
use-cases, a database technology used by Mattock should most likely opt to
choose either graph or document oriented NoSQL technology over traditional
SQL servers. Further, the chosen database technology preferably should be
distributed. A quick market scan has revealed ArangoDb to possess all three
desired qualities. ArangoDb is a distributed hybrid-model database that
supports document and graph operations alike. More research is however
needed to pick the most suitable database technology for Mattock.
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D.7.8 Language-native asynchronous frameworks
When we look at the sizeable code-base of the OCFA framework, we can
identify that a major part of the code-base is made up by the implemen-
tation of a custom asynchronous framework and a custom messaging bus.
Where MattockFS mostly does away with the need for a custom messaging
bus as it abstracts away the message bus with a file-system layer, the need
for a custom asynchronous framework has fully disappeared. NodeJS has
mainstreamed language-specific asynchronous frameworks, and choosing for
example Twisted for a Python based implementation of the module frame-
work would take away much of the implementation time of such a module
framework. The remaining per-language module framework would only need
to implement:
• Communication with MattockFS according to the filesystem based API
that that system provides.
• Throttling.
• Use of a libmagic library for the given language as to determine mime-
types of unidentified data.
• Distributed state-full rule-list processing to set the next module for a
batch.
• An evidence tree API for implementing modules in a given language
and the throttled evidence tree tree-walking logic.
D.7.9 A single tree-graph, lambda and asynchronous
operation oriented API
OCFA had multiple APIs for making a module. The historic API was quite
simple, but less suitable for deriving deep hierarchies from a single source.
The newer tree-graph API was a bit more complex but also powerful enough
to allow meta-data to be added to entities at each level of the tree. Given
that a tree-graph API can be used to express each type of module, even sim-
ple ones, it is suggested that the Mattock module framework API be inspired
by the OCFA tree-graph API. Given modern developments in programming
languages that support a more functional higher order approach to program-
ming. A modern API should probably leverage these developments and move
away from a mostly object oriented approach to a more lambda oriented API.
The creation of such an API should be subject of further study.
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D.8 Conclusion
While MattockFS provides proof of the possibility to leverage the power
of CarvPath entities as basis for a disk-cache efficient privilege separated
forensic framework, the implementation of a whole framework that is usable
in both an academic setting and for full scale investigations will require quite
some additional research. This appendix sketched the outlines of such a
framework.
Appendix E
File-system structure as API
E.1 Base file-system structure
• mattockfs.ctl
• carvpath/
– <cp-entity>.<ext>
– <cp-entity>/
∗ <cp-entity>.<ext>
∗ <cp-entity>
• actor/
– <actor-name>.ctl
– <actor-name>.inf
• worker
– <worker-handle>.ctl
• job
– <job-handle>.ctl
• mutable
– <mutable-handle>.dat
In this appendix we describe the technical interface to the MattockFS user-
space file-system. This interface consists of three main parts.
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• The classical CarvFS-style interface of the carvpath based read-only
self-flattening data access
• The framework geared interface centered around the core concepts of
actors, workers and jobs
• The interface for the write-once approach to mutable data and meta-
data storage
The second and third part aim to be an API implemented as file-system
interface. To understand the API as file-system interface, we first need to
discuss the core concepts of actors,workers and jobs, and the concept of sparse
capabilities and their use as handle to in-file-system state.
E.2 Actors, workers & jobs
On a system running MattockFS there can be multiple worker processes
running. A worker process handles evidence data or evidence meta-data of
a particular type, and the code for processing such data is called an actor.
The process running that code is seen as a worker. There can be multiple
workers of the same actor running on one machine. This can be particularly
useful for single-threaded worker with a high CPU-load/data-volume ratio
on a server with multiple dozens of processing cores. Most actors will need
only one worker running on a single MattockFS instance. Most actors will
not initiate any work, but will work with evidence-data or meta-data that
is given to its instance as job. During the processing of a job, the evidence
data can be used to extract either sub-entities (that can be designated by a
carvpath annotation), extracted entities that introduce new content to the
repository, or evidence meta-data that represents meta information regard-
ing the evidence data. Once a job is done, the worker needs to submit the
evidence-data for further processing by an other actor or for chain termina-
tion by the data-store-module. Sub-entities , extracted data and meta-data
also constitute jobs that must be submitted to other actors.
E.3 Sparse capabilities as handles
MattockFS aims to provide a least-authority cross-tool laboratory variant of
a sealed digital evidence bag (S-DEB). To do this, MattockFS runs under a
special uid different from that used by any actor. It defines all data in the
repository as file-system enforced immutable data after the initial initializa-
tion. Further, the file-system is made responsible for provenance meta-data
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regarding the lab tool-chain. The workers provide the normal evidence meta-
data as storage entities, but the file-system keeps track of provenance as part
as its role as trusted sub-system. In order for the file-system to truly func-
tion as anti-forensics resistant trusted code-base, running it as a different
user is not sufficient. The system will need to be hardened to keep workers
from interfering with each others processes and provenance chains, and at
the same time, allow actors to be written that can invoke tools that still
have access to essential data or sub-functionality. This is needed to keep the
system flexible enough for reactive usage. In order to facilitate this, we look
at the concept of sparse capabilities. Sparse capabilities are authority tokens
or handles that are represented as unguessable strings. The same way that
in a programming language an object gets passed by reference to an other
object, so can a sparse capability be handed to an other process. An example
where this technique of using sparse capabilities together with a user-space
file-system and hardening setups was shown to be usable is the MinorFS
least-authority file-system.
E.4 mattockfs.ctl
This file represents the archive as a whole. This pseudo file defines two
readable extended attributes:
E.4.1 mattockfs.ctl::full_archive
This extended attribute returns a relative CarvPath representing the whole
current archive.
E.4.2 mattockfs.ctl::fadvise_status
This extended attribute is meant as a hint to the framework for throttling
purposes. The value is a semicolon separated list with core file-system figures
that may be used to determine if input throttling should be considered.
• fadv_normal_size : The total amount of the MattockFS archive cur-
rently marked as normal.
• fadv_dontneed_size : The total amount of the MattockFS archive cur-
rently marked as dontneed.
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E.5 carvpath/
The carvpath directory is the core of the MattockFS interface. The directory
itself has its access mask set to x only (0x111). This means that no directory
listing is allowed, nor are file or directory creation actions. Files that fall
within the size range of the repository don’t need to be created though, they
just are and can be accessed.
E.6 carvpath/<cp-entity>.<ext>
Any designation of a carvpath that is valid within the bounds of the repos-
itory size can be used to get a read-only pseudo file that can be used by
any forensic or non-forensic tool that expect to work on a regular file. These
CarvPath files have a set of read only extended attributes to be used either by
human operators, the Mattock framework or a possible future user-interface.
The file may be designated with any file extension as to accommodate pro-
cessing tools. Some tools for processing a specific type of file won’t run
unless the file name has an expected file extension. For this reason, any
file-extension is treated the same.
E.6.1 carvpath/<cp-entity>.<ext>::opportunistic_hash
This read-only extended attribute represents the current opportunistic hash-
ing state of a carvpath. Its content consists of two semicolon separated fields:
• hash : If opportunistic hashing has completed, this field is non empty
and contains the BLAKE2 hash of the carvpath entity.
• hash_offset : If opportunistic hashing has not yet completed, this field
contains the offset of the first file-data yet to be included in hash cal-
culation.
E.6.2 carvpath/<cp-entity>.<ext>::fadvise_status
The value of this read only extended attribute is a semicolon separated list
with information of the overall fadvise related state of the carvpath:
• fadv_normal_size : The total amount of this carvpath currently marked
as normal.
• fadv_dontneed_size : The total amount of this carvpath currently
marked as dontneed.
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E.7 carvpath/<cp-entity>/
Without an extension, the CarvPath annotation in the carvpath directory
refers to a sub directory. Like the carvpath directory, this directory has
mode 0x111 and thus can’t be listed. The directory provides the possibility
to work with nested carvpath entities by means of flattening symbolic links,
thus allowing CarvPath aware forensic tools to produce new valid CarvPath
entities by designating a relative path and dereferencing the symbolic link.
E.8 carvpath/<cp-entity/<cp-entity> and
carvpath/<cp-entity>/<cp-entity>.<ext>
If an entry itself is a valid CarvPath, with or without an extension, than the
entry is represented by a symbolic link back into the data directory, carrying
the exact same extension. The file-system will flatten the carvpath into
representing the proper data entity. For example: data/3145728+786432/
1048576+65536.gif will be a symlink to ../4194304+65536.gif.
E.9 actor/
The actor directory is meant as an entry point to the API into the MatockFS
AnyCast functionality. It allows a module to register as a worker for a given
actor. Like the carvpath directory, the actor directory has its access mask
set to x only (0x111). This means that no directory listing is allowed, nor
are file or directory creation actions.
E.10 actor/<actor-name>.ctl
This per-actor file is meant to be used by the workers for the specific named
actor themselves. It is advised that in an operational setup, access to this
pseudo-file is restricted to the specific named actor implementation using
MAC facilities such as SELinux or AppArmor in order to prevent anti-forensic
attacks against MatockFS.
E.10.1 actor/<actor-name>.ctl::register_worker
If a process wants to register as an worker for a particular actor, it should
fetch a worker sparse-cap by reading this extended attribute. On each at-
tribute read invocation a new instance representation is generated within
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MattockFS. The extended attribute should thus only be retrieved once by
every module instance. The link generated refers to a unique per worker
control node where the worker can start accepting jobs and cooperating with
the rest of the Mattock framework actors.
E.10.2 actor/<actor-name>.ctl::weight
This mutable extended attribute defines the weight that is assigned to the
AnyCast-set of this actor for load-balancing purposes. The default value is
100. The weight is meant to represent the CPU/data-volume ratio in such
a way that 100 represents the 100% value of a default module. A very CPU
intensive module may have a weight multiple orders of magnitude higher. The
idea is that jobs for high weight values are good candidates for migration to
other nodes in load-balancing scenarios.
E.10.3 actor/<actor-name>.ctl::overflow
This mutable extended attribute defines the number of entities in the actor’s
AnyCast-set that should not be considered candidates for migration. The de-
fault value is 10. By changing this value, the eagerness of the load-balancing
process is tunable. We consider migration to be expensive and premature
migration undesirable. It may be desirable to decrease the value of this at-
tribute for high weight modules or to increase it for modules that are low on
both IO operations and CPU load, for example modules that only extract
limited meta-data from large archives.
E.11 actor/<actor-name>.inf
This per-actor file is meant to be used by workers of other modules that need
to route messages to the given actor. No MAC protection is required.
E.11.1 actor/<actor-name>.inf::worker_count
This read-only extended attribute returns the count of the number of workers
that are currently registered for the named actor.
E.11.2 actor/<actor-name>.inf::anycast_status
This extended attributes provides information about the anycast-set for the
designated module. The content of this attribute is a semicolon separated
list with the following meta-data:
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• set_size : The current number of entities in the anycast set for this
actor.
• set_volume : The current amount of archive data the current anycast
set represents.
It is up to the envisioned module framework code-base to make sure the
information is used for effective throttling, balancing the need for effective
system resource and processing power usage with the mitigation of disk-
cache-miss levels.
E.12 worker/
Like the carvpath and actor directory, the worker directory has its access
mask set to x only (0x111). This means that no directory listing is allowed,
nor are file or directory creation actions. The directory is meant as hold-
ing point for instance handle pseudo directories. While protection of this
directory with MAC is not needed, the Linux /proc file-system might allow
leaking of sparse-capabilities used here, thus MAC limitations on /proc are
advised in order to protect access to this directory.
E.13 worker/<worker-handle>.ctl
Each worker has its own worker-handle node for interacting with the Mat-
tockFS anycast functionality.
E.13.1 worker/<worker-handle>.ctl::job_select_policy
In our fact-finding study on OCFA timing we discovered that the priority
queuing used by OCFA was largely ineffective. In MattockFS we no longer
have priority queues, we have sortable sets instead. So rather than asking an
Anycast functionality for the next highest priority entity in the queue, we ask
for the first entity in the set according to a given sorting policy. MattockFS
implements a number of choices to the framework layer in the form of a
policy string. The policy string consists of a number of consecutive letters
that represent set-member properties that can be used for sorting. The next
letter from such a string is only used in case of equality according to previous
letters. In the end, the entity to be returned will be the one at the start of
the resulting sorted set. The sort-policy string can consist of the following
letters;
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• R : Prefer entities that contain fragment chunks that have the highest
currently existing reference-count. The idea would be that processing
these entities might have the greatest opportunistic-hashing impact if
processing this entity could make the opportunistic hashing of more
entities progress.
• r : Prefer entities that contain fragment chunks that have a reference-
count of one. The idea would be that processing this entity will allow
the ref-count=1 chunks to be marked as no longer needed, thus reducing
page-cache pressure.
• O : Prefer entities that contain a fragment chunk with the lowest pos-
sible fragment offset. The idea would be that opportunistic hashing is
sequential and not processing this entity first might intervene with its
opportunistic hashing later on.
• H : Prefer entities that contain a fragment chunk with the lowest pos-
sible hashing offset parent reference. The idea would be that oppor-
tunistic hashing is sequential and not processing this entity first might
intervene with its opportunistic hashing later on. The difference with
the O lies in the fact that here the data that has already been oppor-
tunistically hashed is ignored.
• D : Prefer entities with the lowest density of chunks with the highest
currently existing reference-count. The idea is that processing enti-
ties containing much highest-ref-count fragments are less likely to con-
tribute much to freeing up page-cache in the short run.
• d : Prefer entities with the lowest density of chunks with a reference-
count other than one. The idea would be that processing these first
will free up page-cache.
• W : Prefer entities with the lowest weighted average reference count.
The idea would be that processing these first would contribute to freeing
page-cache in the least amount of steps.
• S : Prefer entities with the lowest total size. The idea is that small
entities take up relatively much in-process state for the file-system and
can be handled quite quickly.
• K : Ignore the anycast set for the module, create a new kick-starting
job instead.
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Note that different sorting policies may be beneficial depending on the cur-
rent page-cache pressure caused by MattockFS. It might also be different
depending on the specific module access patterns and/or system load char-
acteristics. Further research is needed to determine the most appropriate
policy. It is up to the framework, not the file-system to choose the proper
sorting policy
E.13.2 worker/<worker-handle>.ctl::actor_select_policy
For normal modules the concept of anycast-set selection is not relevant as
those modules only access the set bound to their module name. For the
load-balancer however, the next job may come from any module and a set
selection policy is needed. This policy is partially related to the weight and
overflow extended attributes of actor/<actor-name>.ctl, settable attributes
that plays a part in selecting the set. Like the sort-policy string, the set-
selection-policy string consists of a number of ordered characters used in
sorting, but now it’s the sets themselves that are sorted. Other than for
the sort-policy string, the sorting will favor the largest value rather than the
lowest. It is important to note that the overflow extended attribute defines
a minimum value of entities in a module’s set that is not to result in any
migrational activity and thus modules staying below this threshold will not
be part of the sorting and selecting process.
• S : Prefer the set holding the highest number of entities. This policy
should be preferred for CPU related load-balancing.
• V : Prefer the set with the highest total entity volume. This policy
might be preferred for page-cache over-pressure related load-balancing.
• D : Prefer the set with the highest entity-count/volume ratio, what is
the same as the lowest average entity size.
• W : Prefer the the set with the highest weight module (as set with the
weight extended attribute.
• C : Prefer the set with the highest weight× entitycount
volume
number. This
should represent small yet CPU intensive jobs that should be very much
suitable for migration.
We suggest that the C should be a sane default, and given that this string
is ignored for regular modules may be uses for those as well.
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E.13.3 worker/<worker-handle>.ctl::unregister
This attribute will be set to the value 0 until it is explicitly set to 1 indicating
the de-registration of the module instance.
E.13.4 worker/<worker-handle>.ctl::accept_job
Explicitly fetching this extended attribute will return a new sparse capability
for a job. The worker accepting this job is expected to assume responsibility
for it and handle the job appropriately.
E.14 job/
This directory is meant to provide the JOB related API functionality for
module instances. Like the data and module directory, the job directory has
its access mask set to x only (0x111). So again no directory listing is allowed,
nor are any file or directory creation actions. As with the worker subdir, no
MAC is needed to protect this directory, yet MAC restriction for /proc is
strongly advised in an operation setting.
E.15 job/<job-handle>.ctl
This pseudo file is meant as main handle for job processing by a module
instance.
E.15.1 job/<job-handle>.ctl::routing_info
This extended attribute is made-up out of two parts separated by a semicolon.
The first part is the name of the module that was to receive this entity as
job. The second part is meant to contain a state variable that could be
used by a distributed FIVES-OCFA-router style routing facility within the
computer-forensic framework. The idea of the FIVES-OCFA-router was that
an entity traversed a routing rule-list based on meta-data artifacts. When
after being processed by an other module the entity returned at the router
functionality, the router state string was used to find the location in the
rule-list to continue the processing. A module may update this extended
attribute to a valid module name and router state. Doing so should close
the job for the current worker and forward it to a next actor in the projected
tool-chain.
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E.15.2 job/<job-handle>.ctl::job_carvpath
This readable attribute returns the carvpath for the data or meta-data that
belongs with this job. This carvpath designates the data that the module
should process in this job.
E.15.3 job/<job-handle>.ctl::submit_child
A module instance may create new child entities using a carvpath designation
relative to the parent entity. Submitting a child is done by writing a set of
semicolon separated fields to this extended attribute:
• carvpath of the child entity
• actor name for next hop in tool-chain
• a router-state string
• mime-type of the data
• file extension suitable for the data
E.15.4 job/<job-handle>.ctl::allocate_mutable
If instead of marking a designatable carvpath, a module instance needs new
storage to store extracted data or meta-data from the input evidence-data,
then the module-instance can ask for a new mutable file to store the derived
data in. The value of this attribute should be set to the desired data size.
After setting this attribute, the extended attribute current_mutable will be
assigned a value.
E.15.5 job/<job-handle>.ctl::current_mutable
This extended attribute returns a mutable data sparse capability for the last
mutable allocated for this job. This is a fixed size sparse file that should be
filled by the module.
E.15.6 job/<job-handle>.ctl::frozen_mutable
While a mutable sparse-capability can be used within the processing of a job,
it should not be forwarded to the next actor. To forward the new data to a
next actor, it should first be frozen. Retrieving this extended attribute will
yield a carvpath for a frozen version of the mutable data. After this attribute
is first read, the mutable entity gets invalidated and ceases to be mutable.
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E.16 mutable/
Again a directory with mode 0x111. This directory is meant as holder for
fixed-size mutable file entities. As with the previous two directories, this
directory is used with sparse capabilities and as such it’s security hinges on
appropriately secured access to the /proc file-system on Linux.
E.17 mutable/<new-data-handle>.dat
A file accessible through a new-data-handle is a fixed size, initially sparse,
mutable data entity that remains valid and mutable within a small time-
window determined by the use of job-level attributes. The file may be used
for extracted data, for example from a compressed file, or for storage of
evidence meta-data. We should look at this time-window as the filling of a
digital evidence bag just prior to sealing the bag. All later operations on the
data can only take place in a read-only manner, as the data is considered to
be sealed after initialization.
E.18 Python API
The file-system as an API described in this appendix is not meant to be used
directly by the module framework or load balancer. Instead, a convenience
API is included in the MattockFS code-base. This API consists of two parts:
• A MattockFS Python API
• A Carvpath Python API
E.18.1 Base module operations
The following snippet of code shows how the MattockFS API is imported, a
mount-point is bound to and an actor context is acquired.
#!/usr/bin/python
from mattock.api import MountPoint
..
mp = MountPoint("/var/mattock/mnt/0")
context = mp.register_worker("ewf2mattock","K")
..
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A full description of the Python API falls outside of the scope of this ap-
pendix. Important is that the API provides all functionality that the file-
system as an API does. There should be no need for a module framework or
load balancer written in Python to directly use the file-system as API. The
two APIs are to be found in the files api.py and carvpath.py in the MattockFS
code-base.
